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I. INTRODUCTION
Articles about the rise of the Internet,' "surfing the Net," "elec-
tronic coffee houses," computer bulletin boards and the World Wide
Web occupy many-column inches of ink on paper. To businesses, the
prospect of contracting in cyberspace 2 seems an alluring one, and very
1. The Internet has its origins in the work of the Advanced Research Projects Agency of
the United States Department of Defense. ARPA, later DARPA, commissioned MIT's Lincoln
Laboratory to study computer networking. Lincoln Lab's work resulted in the 1965 report "A
Cooperative Network of Time-Sharing Computers," establishing the basic concepts of computer
linking. Later, in December 1968, Bolt Beranek and Newman was awarded an ARPA contract to
undertake the actual design of a network later named ARPANet. In September 1969 the first
links were established between computers located at UCLA, Stanford Research Institute (later
SRI International), University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Utah, The
first public demonstration of ARPANet vas at the International Conference of Computers and
Communications held in Washington, DC in October 1972. In 1985-86 the National Science
Foundation became interested in proliferating the use of computer communications among col-
leges and universities, and NSFNet was formed as a backbone for computer communications.
The Department of Defense abandoned ARPANet in 1990, and in its place NSFNet and other
public agency networks have become the principal backbone of the Internet. See generally,
Jeffrey A. Hart et al., The Building of the Internet: Implications for the Future of Broadband
Networks, TELECOMM. PoL'Y, Nov. 1992, at 666; DANIEL C. LYNCH & MARSHALL T. ROSE,
IlNmRET SYsTEM HANDBOOK, chs. 1-3 (1993).
2. The term "cyberspace" is usually attributed to science fiction writer William Gibson,
who used the term in his science fiction trilogy to describing a virtual world. WILLIAM GIBSON,
NEUROMANCER (1984); WILLIAM GIBSON, CouNT ZERO (1986); WILLIAM GIBSON, MONA LIsA
OvERDivE (1988).
"The matrix has its roots in primitive arcade games," said the voice-over, "in
early graphics programs and military experimentation with cranial jacks." On the
Sony, a two-dimensional space war faded behind a forest of mathematically gen-
erated ferns, demonstrating the special possibilities of logarithmic spirals; cold
blue military footage burned through, lab animals wired into test systems, helmets
feeding into fire control circuits of tanks and war planes. Cyberspace. A consen-
sual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every
nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts... A graphic representa-
tion of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system.
Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind,
clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding.
WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
Other definitions of cyberspace have been given:
I'm using the term "cyberspace" a lot more broadly, as a lot of people have lately.
I'm using it to encompass the full array of computer-mediated audio and/or video
interactions that are already widely dispersed in contemporary societies - from
things as ubiquitous and universal as the ordinary telephone, to things that are still
basically coming on-line, like computer bulletin boards and networks like Prod-
igy, or like the WELL (Whole Earth 'Lectronic Link).
Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond the Electronic
Frontier, PRoc. OF rm FiRsr CON I. ON COMPTER , FREmOM & PIvACY, Mar. 26, 1991, at 3.
My topic is how to "map" the text and structure of our Constitution onto what
might be called the texture and topology of "cyberspace." I'm sure you know that
that term [was] coined by cyberpunk novelist William Gibson. A lot of people
use it to describe a "place" without physical walls or even physical dimensions,
the place where ordinary telephone conversations "happen," where voice-mail and
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au courant. "Just turn on, dial in, and see for yourself. Boot up a
program called Mosaic in your desktop with the mere click of a few
graphical buttons you can see the future of the Internet - on a virtual
stroll through what's easily its hippest, most exciting 'neighbor-
hood.' ,,3 More than seventy-five countries have full service links to
the Internet and computer owners in at least seventy-seven more coun-
tries are able to send electronic messages ("e-mail") through the Net.'
"With the Internet, the whole globe is one marketplace." 5 Simply in-
vest in a modem, obtain an Internet connection through a local access
provider, and you are in business negotiating contracts electronically,
world-wide.
Even law firms are getting into the act. Boston-based Hale & Dorr
is using the Net to speed up and cut the costs of some routine work.
If a client company needs a contract for a foreign distributor, say, it
can fill out an electronic questionnaire and send it over the Internet
to a Hale & Dorr computer. Expert-system software then con-
structs a draft document from boilerplate text. A lawyer reviews
the document, makes necessary changes, and ships it back over the
Net to the client - complete with a list of recommended lawyers in
the other country. 6
The size of the market is enormous.7 One study shows the rise of new
Internet business registrations from 93 in 1990 to 18,425 for 1994 by
August 15, 1994. Another report, published by Internet supplier Merit
Network, shows NSF Net traffic rising from ten billion character
packets per month in 1992 to approximately seventy billion by the
e-mail messages are stored and sent back and forth, and where computer-gener-
ated graphics are transmitted and transformed, all in the form of interactions
among countless users and between users and the computer itself.
Id.
Cyberspace, in its present condition, has a lot in common with the 19th Century
West. It is vast, unmapped, culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally terse (un-
less you happen to be a court stenographer), hard to get around in, and up for
grabs. Large institutions already claim to own the place, but most of the actual
natives are solitary and independent, sometimes to the point of sociopathy. It is,
of course, a perfect breeding ground for both outlaws and new ideas about liberty.
John P. Barlow, Crime and Puzzlement: In Advance of the Law on the Electronic Frontier,
WHoLE EARTH Rev., Sept. 1990, at 45.
3. John W. Verity & Robert D. Hof, The Internet: How it Will Change the Way You Do
Business, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 1994, at 80.
4. Id at 82. The first electronic mail, or e-mail as it is now known, was sent in 1971. See
LYNCH & Rosa, supra note 1, at 9.
5. Verity & Hof, supra note 3, at 81.
6. Id
7. Jared Sandberg, Net Working: Corporate America is Falling in Love with the Internet,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at R14; Peter H. Lewis, U.S. Begins Privatizing Internet's Opera-
tions, N.Y. Tuvms, Oct. 24, 1994, at Dl; Verity & Hof, supra note 3, at 81.
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beginning of 1995. Business Week estimates that there are twenty mil-
lion individuals currently linked to the Net, with thousands more join-
ing monthly.' "Companies are signing up in a frenzy. The Internet
has become a central corporate resource and companies don't want to
be left behind."9
The Internet connection allows marketing, sales, customer sup-
port and procurement personnel to connect to the wider world through
the Net, while on the road, at remote offices or even in the air, thus
allowing business to be done from nontraditional locations. "[T]he
most common use of the Internet among companies is... basic: zap-
ping information that just can't wait for Federal Express."' 0 Time
concepts disappear - the Net is on twenty-four hours a day. By link-
ing buyers and sellers electronically and eliminating paperwork, inter-
nal transaction costs should drop dramatically." "Telephone tag"
becomes a relic of a bygone era, because the computer captures your
messages whenever you are away from your desk, on the phone,
hooked to another user, or otherwise not taking messages. Facsimile
(fax) traffic can be sent and received through the Net, thus linking you
with last year's "faster" means of communication. You can even use
your personal computer to send telex messages to, and receive telex
messages from, third world countries where the telephone lines, and
information infrastructure, are not advanced as e-mail techniques of
the modem industrial state. Delivery of consumer and business
software via the Internet may soon become a reality for mainstream
publishers,' 2 and the ultimate in spending money - "electronic cash" -
is on the immediate horizon.' 3 HAL is on your desk, digital cash in
8. Some have questioned the methodology used in creating these numbers, and suggest
that the actual numbers, while still dramatic, are far lower.
The Internet is distributed by nature. This is its strongest feature, since no single
entity is in control, and its pieces run themselves, cooperating to form the network
of networks that is the Internet. However, because no single entity is in control,
nobody knows everything about the Internet. Measuring it is especially hard be-
cause some parts choose to limit access to themselves to various degrees. So,
instead of measurement, we have various forms of surveying and estimation.
See John S. Quarterman (ed.), The Internet Number FAQ (1994), MATRIX NEws, gopher//go-
pher.tic.com/OO/matrix/news/4/faq.406.old (on file with the Santa Clara Computer and High
Technology Law Journal)
9. Sandberg, supra note 7.
10. Id.
I1. Verity & Hof, supra note 3. The article cites a Trane Co. study showing a 25% drop in
costs as a result of using Internet connections to administer sales orders and manufacturing
schedules.
12. Joan E. Rigdon, A Trusting Oracle to Enter Market Via Internet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4,
1995, at BI.
13. Electronic cash is discussed in some detail in David Chaum, Achieving Electronic Pri-
vacy, Sci. AM., Aug. 1992, at 96.
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hand, ready to open the "pod doors"14 for business with 48,000 differ-
ent networks around the world all linked through the Internet.15
This paper will propose a realistic scenario of a cyberspace busi-
ness transaction. It will first give a brief overview of how the Internet
works. It will then provide a realistic hypothetical to illustrate the
formation of a contract by an interchange of electronic messages. Af-
ter a discussion of 'ow the law of contracts adjusted to earlier technol-
ogies, the paper will conclude that both the statute of frauds and the
evidentiary purposes it serves are not violated by enforcing contracts
created in cyberspace.
II. How THE INTERNET WORKS
The Internet is not a single computer network, but rather an anar-
chic collection' 6 of computers, and public and private computer net-
works, all daisy chained together through the use of common
protocols and a variety of communications devices. 7 The main ele-
14. HAL was the mainframe computer programmed to control the activities of the space
ship Discovery One in Stanley Kubrick's classic 1968 science fiction film 2001: A SPACE ODYs-
sEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968). HAL was able to see and hear, and at several points in the
movie the astronauts orally command HAL to "open the pod doors" of the EVA units.
15. Verity & Hof, supra note 3, at 80.
16. The RAND proposal (the brainchild of RAND staffer Paul Baran) was made
public in 1964. In the first place, the network would have no central authority.
Furthermore, it would be designed from the beginning to operate while in tatters.
The principles were simple. The network itself would be assumed to be
unreliable at all times. It would be designed from the get-go to transcend its own
unreliability. All the nodes in the network would be equal in status to all other
nodes, each node with its own authority to originate, pass, and receive messages.
The messages themselves would be divided into packets, each packet separately
addressed. Each packet would begin at some specified source node, and end at
some other specified destination node. Each packet would wind its way through
the network on an individual basis.
The particular route that the packet took would be unimportant. Only final
results would count. Basically, the packet would be tossed like a hot potato from
node to node to node, more or less in the direction of its destination, until it ended
up in the proper place. If big pieces of the network had been blown away, that
simply wouldn't matter, the packets would still stay airborne, lateralled wildly
across the field by whatever nodes happened to survive. This rather haphazard,
delivery system might be "efficient" in the usual sense (especially compared to,
say, the telephone system) - but it would be extremely rugged.
Bruce Sterling, Short History of the Internet (1993), June 14, 1996, http://www.nac.gmu.edu/
monllnteretlSterlingHistoryOflnternet.html (citing MAG. oF FANTASY & Sct. FICrTON, Feb.
1993) (on file with the Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal).
17. The Internet Engineering Task Force, a cooperative international standards making
organization, and the Internet Research Task Force, exist to promote common goals and techni-
cal standards. See generally, HARLEY HAHN & RICK SToUT, THE INTERNET COMPLETE RER-
ENcE (1994); LYNCH & RosE, supra note 1; PAUL BACZ-WSKI Er AL., THE IrERNET UmNEAsHE
(1994).
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ments of the Internet are linked through high-speed communications
backbones, and the wider public participates on the Internet through
local telephone companies and a variety of privately and publicly
funded Internet service providers. The common denominator for e-
mail communications is the use of a standard programming protocol,
TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol - upon
which inter-computer communications are based.
The TCP protocol divides messages into packets which are
marked with a sequence number and the address of the recipient. TCP
also inserts error control information. The packets are then sent over
the network to the addressee. The routing of the individual packets
varies, with IP controlling the transport of the packets to the remote
host computer.' 8 At the remote host, TCP receives the packets and
checks for errors. When an error occurs, TCP asks for the particular
packet to be re-sent. Once all the packets have been received, TCP
will then use the sequence number to reconstruct the original message.
It is the job of IP to get the packets from one place to another; it is the
job of TCP to manage the flow and insure that the data are correct.
There are three methods in common use to connect to what is
known as the Internet. The direct Internet connection requires a TI,
dedicated 56K, or switched 56K data line. If one has a T1 or 56K
connection, one is said to be directly "on" the Internet, in the sense
that messages can be sent directly from computer to computer. Many
organizations cannot afford to have a direct permanent Internet con-
nection, however. In this case they arrange to have a nearby Internet
site act as a mail gateway, and provide other Internet access services,
via a SLIP/PPP connection. The subscriber will have a mailing ad-
dress that looks much like a standard Internet address, but the sub-
scriber itself is not really "on" the Internet. 9 To gain Internet access
the remotely located computer, using a modem and the TCP/IP plus
SLIP/PPP software, dials into the host computer and from there logs
on to the Internet or sends mail to, and receives mail from, Internet
addressees. The third way of getting on the Internet is through an on-
line service such as America On-Line, Prodigy, Compuserve, or Del-
phi. Each of these services offers subscribers the ability to exchange
e-mail messages with companies and individuals on the service, and
well as with companies and individuals having Internet addresses.
18. A message sent across town can easily end up being routed around the country, as the
connection in any given instance is a function of what computer is connected to what other
computer, and the state of the updating of the link tables in each of the computers along the
route. See generally, LYNCH & RosE, supra note 1, ch. 5.
19. If it important to find out, the "HOST' command can be utilized to determine whether
a company is actually "on" the Interet or is using a gateway service.
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The features of each of these services expand daily, and now each
offers SLIP/PPP type access to the Internet. Once again access for e-
mail and Internet services is via local telephone line and modem to the
service provider, and through the service provider, to the Internet
itself."0
Internet addresses are IP protocol numbers. As is usual with
computers, the reality of addressing messages is masked from the
user, and fortunately e-mail can be addressed by domain name instead
of IP protocol number.21  For example, the IP address,
user@ 128.54.16.1 or the DNS address user@ucsd.edu, could be used
to communicate with the person or entity named USER at the Univer-
sity of California at San Diego. 2
With the Internet address in hand, the data bits representing the
text of the message are composed in ASCII characters on the sender's
computer. The sender's e-mail program then adds the other particu-
lars, such as time, date, and sender, and transfers the message by rout-
ing it over the Internet from one computer to another, until the data
bits end up in the recipient's computer or mailbox. The recipient then
uses his or her local mail reading application program to call the
message text into "view" on his or her workstation display. The
message is typically stored on hard disk or other semi-permanent stor-
age device as it is created by the sender, queued for transmission, and
received by the remote location, and copied into the recipient's
mailbox. Both the sender and the recipient have the option of printing
the message onto paper.
However they are transported, and whatever service or provider
is used, neither the creation nor the receipt of an e-mail message nec-
20. Rick Ayre, Making the Internet Connection, PC MAo., Oct. 11, 1994, at 118, 120.
21. Internet addresses are assigned to Internet hosts by the Intemic Registration Service,
provided by Network Solutions, Inc. of Herndon, Virginia. The Domain Name System keeps
track of the addresses and translates the DNS address into the proper IP address. The Intemic
central Internet registry handles day-to-day administration of the Domain Name System. The
assignment of names tends to be on a first-come, first-served basis and the American Bankers
Association thus acquired the domain name "aba.com" leaving the American Bar Association to
adopt a different domain name. The Internet DNS Names Review Board attempts to mediate
disputes about the assignment of names, such as the dispute between Jim McDonald and Mc-
Donald's Restaurant over the name "mcdonalds.com." See generally Mess.COM, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 15, 1994, at 82.
22. The host computer domain name consists of a host name (UCSD) followed by a stan-
dardized domain extension (EDU). Country codes are usually added to the extension for ad-
dresses outside the United States. The extension on the domain name - the part of the address
after the - symbol - generally identifies the type of organization, and location. Organizational
domains have extensions like COM, NET, ORG or EDU; geographic extensions such as CH
(Switzerland), FR (France), IT (Italy), SG (Singapore) identify a country. For reasons of history,
domain names are actually entered in lower case. Again for reasons of history, the absence of a
country extension on the domain name typically means a domain in the United States.
1996]
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essarily results in the creation of a "writing" in the ordinary sense.23
In the absence of semi-permanent storage mechanisms, or printing,
and given the propensity of some organizations to "clean wipe" the
hard drives or tapes at periodic intervals, the evanescent e-mail
message is easily lost.24
III. GARAGE SYSTEMS COME TO MARKET
A new company, Garage Computer Systems, has been formed in
Silicon Valley, California. Its business plan is based on the manufac-
ture of custom 486/586 workstations, utilizing cell manufacturing
methods, where the necessary raw materials - disk drives, DRAM
memory and CPU chips, chassis, motherboards, modems, NICs, dis-
play adapter cards, CD-ROMs, sound cards, power supplies, wire har-
nesses and cabling - are delivered direct to the cell manufacturing
team for final "screw driver" assembly and test.' The business objec-
tive is to capture the low end of the custom workstation market, where
the specific requirements for customized business workstations are not
being met, except at great cost, by the usual commercial sources. Ga-
rage Computers is very much a "build to suit" organization.
Garage's business plan is predicated on dramatically lowering its
overhead. To achieve that end, Garage has adopted paperless "just in
time" purchasing practices. Regular sources of raw materials are all
linked to Garage through the Internet, and carefully worked out plans
for EDI contracting have been put into place with Garage's major sup-
pliers. 6 Garage is not, however, able to obtain all of its DRAM and
1 23. The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) defines the content of mail messages pass-
ing between computers. The protocol describes a series of control messages passing between the
computers, verifying that the two computers are connected correctly, identifying the sender, ne-
gotiating a set of recipients, and delivering the text of the message. The message text is limited
to ASCII characters, although with the introduction of the mail format Multipurpose Intemet
Mail Extensions (MIME) images, audio and video data may be transmitted as well as text. Use
of an application program to read and compose e-mail is universal, and mail is usually sent to
and collected from a mailbox. Users on computers that are not directly connected with one
another can send and receive mail as a result of the Domain Name System, the use of mail relay
hosts, and the development of mail gateways. The Domain Name System allows the establish-
ment of globally unique, location independent names, and the mail relay host scheme allows
non-specific source routing. Mail gateways allow computer systems having different configura-
tions and using different mail protocols to send messages to and from each other (e.g., from
Compuserve to America On Line). See Lynch & Rose, supra note I, at 186, § 6.3.
24. See generally Armstrong v. Executive Office of President, I F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (dealing with the destruction of electronic copies of documents proposed to be maintained
and achieved in "hard copy" only).
25. See, e.g., The Ceiling Out of America, ECONoMisT, Dec. 17, 1994, at 63.
26. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) refers to a standardized method, agreed upon in
advance between the participating parties, of communicating purchase orders, invoices, and all
other types of transactions through electronic mail, where the intent of the parties is to eliminate
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CPU chip requirements from the major manufacturers, so it regularly
contacts brokers and "surfs the Net" in search of extra supplies.
Internet Memory Systems does business in spot market DRAMs,
CPUs and related products. It is headquartered in Singapore, taking
advantage of Singapore's fiber-optic telecommunications infrastruc-
ture and Singapore's location astride the major air and sea routes.
IMS's world-wide sales force is constantly on the telephone, telex, fax
and the Net, seeking out customers for legitimate and "gray market"
DRAMs, CPUs and other computer components that are in short sup-
ply. The "back office" types at IMS are also on the Net, seeking
sources of supply of products to furnish to IMS' customers.
Fred Smith, North American sales manager of Internet Memory
Systems, is based in San Jose, California. Fred actively solicits poten-
tial customers to purchase their DRAMs and CPUs from IMS. One of
Fred's principal marketing methods is posting messages about the
availability of DRAMs and CPUs in various Net Usegroups.2 7 Fred
also has his own "home page" on the World Wide Web.28
confirmatory paper records and to rely instead upon electronic verification of the transactions.
See Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic Data In-
terchange - A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990);
Robert W. McKeon, Jr., Electronic Data Interchange: Uses and Legal Aspects in the Commer-
cial Arena, 12 J. MARSHALL J. Computrm & IrNo. LAW 511 (1994); Halina S. Dziewit et al., The
Quest for the Paperless Office Electronic Contracting: State of the Art Possibility but Legal
Impossibility?, 5 SANTA CLARA CoMPtrraa & HIGH TECH. LI. 75 (1989). See also, Mary C.
Green, Letters of Credit and the Computerization of Maritime Trade, 3 FLA. I"rr'L L.J. 221
(1988).
27. Usenet describes a means by which computers exchange electronic mail tagged with
predetermined message headers. The message headers are divided into standardized groupings
so that messages can be addressed to the group as a whole. The group is called a Usegroup or
Newsgroup.
Any computer can be part of the Usenet by installing the software necessary to download
and upload the electronic mail destined to and received from the Usegroup. BAczVSwKt, supra
note 17, at 369-70. The UsegrouplNewsgroup address (viz. "misc.legal.computing") typically
gives the "lurker" (someone who reads but does not post messages) some idea of the general
topics under discussion. Be warned, however, the topics can vary widely off the point and inter-
ests of the Usegroup. There are in excess of 7000 different Usegroups, most of which are not
moderated.
28. World Wide Web or WWW is a protocol allowing information to be linked by
hypertext. The WWW was designed and prototyped at the European Laboratory for Particle
Physics (CERN) in Geneva, Switzerland. Il at 620-23. Its great advantage is allowing pictures
and graphic pointers to be imbedded in ordinary text, thus presenting a magazine - like page to
the viewer where the viewer has the ability with a mouse and the click of the mouse button to
"jump" to another computer or to another area where information can be found.
A WWW session always starts at a "home page," typically the home page of the host
computer or Internet provider. Logging into another computer via WWW usually causes the
new host computer's home page to appear on the screen. The home page typically describes the
company or individual sponsoring the home page, and provides other useful information about
can be found at that location.
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Fred recently posted the following message in the Usegroup
"ba.market.computers":
From: fsmith@ix.netcom.com (Fred Smith)
Subject: Internet Memory Systems
Date: 31 Dec 1994 23:53:18 GMT
Organization: Netcom
Come and check out my home page on the WWW.
Here are some of the savings that I offer:
486DX4-100 w/Test SW $350
486 75MHz MB and CPU $230
1MB SHMMS $36
4MB SIMMS $120
16MB SIMMS $420
Call us today, or order from the 'www.
Thank You
Fred Smith fsmith@ix.netcom.com
Certified Netware Engineer,
LAN Analysis
Disclaimer Opinions are Mine, not my
employer's
NetCruiser New User FAQ ftp:/ftp.netcom.comlpub/fsmithlwww/
newuser.html
TIA Setup FAQ
ftp:l/ftp.netcom.comlpublfsmithltialtiasetup.html
Fred's Home Port
ftp://ftp.netcom.comlpublfsmithlwwwlfsmith.html
CONGRESS.SYS
Corrupted: Re-boot Washington D.C. (YIN)?
Garage Systems has obtained an order from a new customer,
Global International Law Services ("GILS"), a prominent legal organ-
ization with offices and professional associates situated around the
world. GILS is revamping the computer network that ties together all
of its offices and professionals, replacing the aging but still powerful
Mosaic, Netscape, and Netcuiser are some of the popular full featured WWW browser
programs.
[Vol. 12
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VAX 11-780 based system at its headquarters, and the Novell Netware
2.12 and MS-DOS 5.0 based LANs in some of its outlying offices
(some of the professionals still use IBM Selectrics or their equivalent)
with a worldwide network of Intel 586-based netservers operating
Novell Netware 3.12 and 4.0 LANs, all tied together over the Internet.
The workstations on the professionals' desks are to be Intel 486DX4-
100 based. GILS requires that the workstations be configured with 32
MB RAM, in order to operate MS-DOS 6.22, Windows for Work-
groups 3.11, OS/2 Warp and Windows 95.
The 1000 unit initial GILS order is the largest order Garage Sys-
tems has ever obtained. The prices at which Garage Systems commit-
ted to obtain the GILS business reflect the superior bargaining power
of GILS and the acumen and technological foresight of its Executive
Director. The margins to be earned by Garage Systems are, to put it
mildly, "razor thin." Garage Systems expects to "make it up in vol-
ume," since GILS anticipates the need for 4000 workstations to outfit
its ever growing group of professionals.
The order from GILS presents a business problem for Garage.
Garage is committed to a rapid build of the workstations, but as a new
business Garage is not high on the favored customer list at Intel and
AMD. Likewise it is in the "background noise scatter" at Toshiba,
Micron, NEC, TI, Samsung and the other large manufacturers of
DRAMs. Andy Acquisition, the director of procurement at Garage
Computers, is instructed by senior management at Garage to obtain
supplies from whatever source he can locate.
Another of the unique aspects of Garage's business is that its
employees are located around the world. They travel where business
dictates, and live where chance, weather, amenities, and previous em-
ployment has taken them. Andy Acquisition, for example, is living in
Neuchatel, Switzerland. He and his Swiss wife have a lovely home
overlooking the Lake, and their children are happily attending the lo-
cal schools. Andy also has a vacation home in Austria. Andy com-
municates with the "factory" by voice, voicemail, video conference
links through his workstation facsimile and the Internet.
Andy frequents various on-line Usegroups to keep abreast of pro-
fessional developments, and "lurks" in the groups known to contain
announcements of the availability of supplies. He sees Fred Smith's
announcement of the availability of CPU chips and memory, and
downloads a copy of the announcement to his workstation. Andy
"surfs" the Net and discovers several individuals who have done busi-
ness with Internet Memory Systems, and Fred, on a satisfactory basis.
Andy gets positive references on IMS from his local banking sources.
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Satisfied with this due diligence and under pressure from Garage
headquarters in San Jose to get supplies of CPU and DRAM into the
pipeline, Andy responds to Fred with an e-mail message. He copies
the message to himself to preserve an electronic copy on his worksta-
tion. Andy's workstation has been programmed to automatically
make a back up copy of his hard disk on a weekly basis on QIC-80
tape, thereby retaining an archived copy of all messages sent or re-
ceived by Andy.
Andy's e-mail message to Fred Smith, filled with typographical
errors as is typical of such traffic, reads as follows:
From andya@garage.pr.net.ch
Sat Dec 31 05:31:04 1994
Received: from chsun.eunet.ch (chsun.eunet.ch [146.228.10.15]) by
get.ix.netcom.com (8.6.9/8.6.5) with ESMTP id FAA09448 for
<fsmith@ix.netcom.com>; Sat, 31 Dec 1994 05:31:03 -0800
Received: from andya.UUCP by chsun.eunet.ch (8.6.4/1.34)id
OAA01660; Sat, 31 Dec 1994 14:32:39 +0100
Received: by garage.pr.net.ch (UUPC/extended 1.12b); Sat, 31 Dec
1994 14:15:10 MET
Date: Sat, 31 Dec 94 14:15:09.
From: "Andy Acquisition" <andya@garage.pr.net.CH>
Message-ID: <2f05595e.andya@garage.pr.net.ch>
To: Fred Smith <fsmith@ix.netcom.com>
Cc: andya@garage.pr.net.ch
Subject: DRAM and CPU Order
I wish to immediately place an order for CPUs and DRAMs neces-
sary to fabricate 1000 work stations specially ordered by our cus-
tomer. Customer demads 32MB DRAM per workstation. Seek
16MB DRAM chips (or 4x4MB DRAM chips if 16MB not avail-
able). Also seek 486DX4-100 chips. Each w/s to have test s/w on
3.5 floppy.
To.facilitate fab, please assemble kits of 32MB DRAM and CPU
wiTest SW in suitable antistat packaging.
Desired shipping schedule is:
Week 1:100 sets
Week 2: 200 sets
Week 3: 300 sets
Week 4: 400 sets
Air Ship > SFO for pickup by Garage Computer Systems, 100
Howard Street, Belmont, CA.
Please confirm receipt of this order and prices by return E-Mail.
Andy Acquisition (andya@garage.pr.net.ch)
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Fred Smith received Andy Acquisition's message on his com-
puter in San Jose. Fred sends an e-mail message to Singapore, for-
warding Andy's message and seeking guidance from Singapore as to
availability of products, and prices. DRAM pricing is particularly vol-
atile, and Fred wants to make sure that IMS makes money on the
transaction and that he obtains his commission which is based on the
profitability of the individual transaction. Singapore gives a favorable
response. This following message from Fred then appears on Andy
Acquisition's workstation:
From fsnith@ix.netcom.com Sat Dec 31 09:41:24 1994
Received: from also.netcom.com (also.netcom.com [199.2.134.6])
by get.netcom.com (8.6.9/8.6.5) with ESMTP id JAA09541 for
<andya>; Sat, 31 Dec 1994 09:41:23 -0800
Received: (andya@localhost) by also.hooked.net (8.6.9/8.6.5) id
JAA26709; Sat, 31 Dec 1994 09:41:08 -0800 Date: Sat, 31 Dec
1994 09:41:08 -0800
From: Fred Smith <fsmith@ix.netcom.com>
Message-Id:<199412311741.JAA26709@also.ix.netcom.com>
To: andya@garage.pr.net.ch
Cc: fsmith@ix.netcom.com
Cc: jsmith@ims.com.sg
Subject: DRAM and 486DX4
Rec'vd UR email. Confirm Toshiba 4 MB lx3 SIMMS 70 NS
available in quantities requested. Price $120 today. Can supply
AMD Am486DX4-100s at $350 with AMD test s/w for each set.
UR Schedule impossible. Can ship following:
Week 1: 50 sets
Week 2:100 sets
Week 3: 250 sets
Week 4: 250 sets
Week 6: 350 sets
Shipment SFO via Singapore Air Cargo. Shipping manifest details
to follow by emial from John Smith, IMS Singapore.
Please wire funds to our bank Development Bank of Singapore,
Acct #67743270 for first set kits. Good funds must be in hand
before each shipment.
Please confirm by return email to hold DRAM price.
Andy Acquisition immediately confirms by e-mail to'Fred, with a
copy sent by e-mail to John Smith at IMS in Singapore. John Smith in
turn sends an e-mail message providing tentative shipping details.
Fred Smith follows John Smith's e-mail message with one of his own,
promising that he can expedite shipment if funds are wired by Garage.
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Garage faces a contract penalty if its shipments to GILS are
delayed. Garage has not informed GILS of the ship schedule for
DRAMs and CPUs - or for that matter the other components - nor has
it advised GILS of the possible impact that the schedule might have on
Garage's shipments to GILS. Garage senior management thus advises
Andy to arrange for a letter of credit in favor of IMS in the required
amounts, to be drawn on when Development Bank of Singapore has
possession of the shipping documents showing the dispatch of the
DRAMs and CPUs to San Francisco. Garage's bank deals directly
with DBS over FedWire in creating the letter of credit, and Fred and
John are notified by e-mail of the creation of the letter of credit at
DBS in favor of IMS. Fred sends an e-mail promising to expedite all
shipments.
Two days after the letter of credit is created in favor of IMS, the
morning news on the Internet announces that the Niihama, Japan,
main resin plant of Sumitomo Chemical, producer of 60 percent of the
epoxy resin used in the fabrication of plastic DRAM chip packaging,
was destroyed in a fire.29 The price of DRAM "explodes," with the
price in the gray market doubling and tripling as the DRAM brokers
and computer manufacturers anticipate immediate shortages of
DRAM chips. Faced with this dramatic escalation in prices, IMS does
not ship to Garage; rather it succumbs to the entreaties of Toshiba and
agrees to sell the chips back to Toshiba at 20 percent over IMS's cost.
Toshiba is one of IMS's main suppliers, although never publicly ac-
knowledged as such, and IMS wishes to remain in its good graces.
Toshiba wants the chips so that it will have stock on hand to allocate
among its regular customers at long-term contract prices.
Garage is a Toshiba customer, having set up EDI purchase ar-
rangements with Toshiba. In times of shortage Toshiba allocates
available DRAM on the basis of historic purchasing volume, and the
duration of the relationship with Toshiba. During the buying panic
after the Sumitomo Chemical fire Toshiba's best customers receive
50% of their historic shipments. As a new customer Garage can ex-
pect very little DRAM from Toshiba.
The prices of CPU chips were spared the impact of the Sumitomo
Chemical fire, because CPU chips, unlike DRAM, are packaged in
ceramic. The problem faced by Garage from the shortage of DRAMs
is compounded by simultaneous local developments in San Jose, how-
ever. Acting at the request of Intel, a U.S. magistrate judge enjoins
29. This event actually occurred. See Fred Gardner, DRAM Chip Prices to Fluctuate in
'94?, Coiwrurm REsmLER News, Sept. 6, 1993, at 101; John McDonough, RAM Prices Are on
the Rise, WINDOws SouRcES, Nov. 1993, at 25.
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the sale by AMD of the Am486.3° The initial public news of the order
does not specify what is to happen to chips already fabricated by
AMD, makes no mention of whether chips already in the hands of
third parties can be shipped, and does not specify which variety of
Am486 chips are effected. Rumors immediately circulate on the Net
that Intel will bring suit to stop shipments of any AMD chips from
coming into the United States from overseas. IMS decides not to risk
shipment into the United States under these conditions. Fred sends an
e-mail message to Garage announcing this decision - in the same
message he offers to ship DRAM to Garage at $240 per 4MB.
Garage panics and resorts to the open market for cover. Garage
manages to secure substitute DRAM chips, and replaces the AMD
chips it had intended to use with higher priced Intel 486 DX4-100s.
Unlike AMD, Intel does not supply test software with the chips. Ga-
rage secures a test suite from Intel that performs this function, but the
Intel license agreement restricts the use of the suite to Garage. Garage
thus cannot supply its customers with test software without procuring
substitute software in the open market.
Garage Computer consults counsel, who recommends that suit be
filed in federal court in San Francisco against Internet Memory Sys-
tems and Fred Smith to recover the difference between the contract
price and the prices that Garage was forced to pay for cover. Garage
also sues to recover the penalty that it expects to eventually pay CILS
for late delivery. Fred Smith cannot be located for service of process,
but IMS is eventually served in accordance with the Hague Conven-
tion and answers the suit. Almost immediately IMS moves for sum-
mary judgment, on the grounds that enforcement of any alleged
agreement between IMS and Garage is barred by reason of the statute
of frauds because there is no signed writing by IMS.
30. This scenaraio is drawn from a real life case. See Intel Wins 486 Microcode Copyright
Issue, Business Wire, Oct. 11, 1994, available on NEXIS; AMD-Intel Agree on Terms of Pre-
liminary Injunction in ICE Case; AMD Will Continue to Ship Am486 Microprocessor, Business
Wire, Oct. 21, 1994, available on NEXIS; John Markoff, Advanced Micro Says Court Gives It
Round in Intel Fight, N.Y. Tams, Oct, 22, 1994, § 1, at 39.
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IV. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS: ORIGINS AND PURPOSES
The original statute of frauds, passed in 1677,31 covers a number
of categories and subjects of contracts. The section of interest here is
section 17.32 Section 17 as originally written provided:
And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That from and
after the said four and twentieth Day of June no Contract for the
Sale of any Goods, Wares and Merchandizes, for the Price of ten
Pounds Sterling or upwards, shall be allowed to be good, except the
Buyer shall accept Part of the Goods so sold, and actually receive
the same, or give something in earnest to bind the Bargain, or in
Part of Payment, or that some Note or Memorandum in Writing of
the said Bargain be made and signed by the Parties to be charged
by such Contract, or their Agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
The original statute of frauds had as its objective the prevention
of perjury, and the subornation of perjury, with respect to the forma-
tion of contracts. The statute of frauds takes the view, carried through
to this day albeit with mounting criticism,33 that certain types of
agreements, and certain subject matter of agreements, are so serious as
to require their commitment to a writing signed by the parties or their
authorized agents. In the absence of a writing no amount of swearing
was to be permitted to prove contracts subject to the Statute.
When evaluating the objective of the Statute and the litigation
that followed in its 300 year wake - creating exceptions that many say
swallowed the Statute, we must bear in mind that the trial as we now
know it was a relatively new phenomenon in 1677. The rules of evi-
dence were then just being developed. 34 Trial practice in 1677 pre-
vented interested witnesses - those who were parties to the contract -
from testifying to its terms and to the striking of a bargain. Instead,
parol evidence from third parties was offered to show the making of a
contract. Great dissatisfaction was expressed about this in the law
courts:
31. The history of the enactment of the statute of frauds is examined in Crawford D. Hen-
ing, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. I1.c.3) and Their Authors, 61 U. PENN.
L. Re-v. 283 (1913); see also 6 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HiSTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 379 (1927).
32. In the original text this appears as paragraph 16, and is referenced as either paragraph
16 or paragraph 17 in the treatises. The error was apparently made in transcribing the original
text when the Statutes at Large were compiled.
33. Sunset-Stemau Food Co. v. Bonzi, 389 P.2d 133, 136 n.3 (Cal. 1964) ("The commen-
tators almost unanimously urge that considerations of policy indicate a restricted application of
the statute of frauds, if not its total abolition.").
34. In Bushell's Case, just seven years before passage of the statute of frauds, the court
thought it proper for a jury to evaluate the case from its own pre-trial understanding of the facts,
without any evidence being presented. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
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It is come to that pass now, that every thing is made an action on
the case, and actions on the case are become one of the great griev-
ances of the nation; for two men cannot talk together but one fellow
or other, who stands in a comer, swears a promise and cause of
action. These catching promises must not be encouraged. It were
well if a law were made whereby some ceremony, as striking hands
etc., were required to every promise that should bind.3 5
The statute of frauds can thus be viewed as a improvement on the law
of evidence - by requiring better "proof' of contracts - and a device to
control the otherwise unbridled discretion of the jury to find contracts
upon the dubious evidence of third parties and not from the testimony
of the principals. 36 To both of these ends it required the production of
a writing signed by the party to be charged in order to make the con-
tract enforceable at law.3 7
V. THE MODERN STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The statute of frauds survives in various forms today in the
United States.3 8 The California codes, for example, contain several
35. A. W. B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT. THE RISE OF THE
ACTION OF AssuMPsrr 603 (1975) (quoting Buckridge v. Shirley, Treby's Rep. (1671)).
36. North, C.J., was trying an action brought by a cook for goods sold. The de-
fendants produced a receipt which showed that he had been paid up to 1677.
"The cook started forth from the crowd; and, 'My Lord,' said he very quick and
earnest, 'I was paid but to 1676.' At that moment his lordship concluded the cook
said true; for liars do not use to burst out in that unpremeditated manner... He
asked the cook again and again, if he was sure; to see if he would stammer or
hesitate, as liars will often do; but his answer was blunt and positive as before.
Then his lordship, in the nisi prius court in London, sitting under a window,
turned round, and looked through the paper against the light; and so discovered
plainly the last figure in the date of the year was 6, in rasure; but was wrote 7 with
ink" - clearly this would not have been discovered if the judge had not been
impressed by the demeanour of one who could not have been called as a witness.
HoLDSwORTH, supra note 31, at 389 n.3.
37. The exceptions found in the original statute of frauds - earnest money, part payment,
acceptance and receipt of the goods - continue to find their way into the modem statutes of
frauds. Likewise the courts of Chancery developed the doctrine of part performance taking the
contract out of the operation of the statute. The most popular modem "exception" to the statute
of frauds is equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950);
Moore v. Day, 266 P.2d 51 (Cal. App. 1954); Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249
Cal. Rptr. 872 (1988).
38. The English version adopted in 1677 did not automatically become part of American
law. Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137, 144 (1829) ('The common law of England is not to be
taken, in all respects, to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general princi-
ples, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted, only that portion
which was applicable to their situation."). In fact, American law on the subject preceded devel-
opments in England. In 1647 the Rhode Island legislature passed a statute requiring that convey-
ances by deeds be in writing. WILLIAM F. WALSH, HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMmCAN LAW 92 n.28
(2d ed. 1932).
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provisions requiring contracts be in writing.39 The Uniform Commer-
cial Code, adopted in 49 states,4" applies in the case of "transactions in
goods."'" The California version of U.C.C. § 2201 provides:
39. For example, California Civil Code § 1624 applies to contracts that are not subject to
the provisions of the California version of the Uniform Commercial Code. It provides that:
The following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum
thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party's
agent:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof.
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another,
except in the cases provided for in Section 2794.
(c) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale
of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent
of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in
writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.
(d) An agreement authorizing or employing an agent, broker, or any other person
to purchase or sell real estate, or to lease real estate for a longer period than one
year, or to procure, introduce, or find a purchaser or seller of real estate or a lessee
or lessor of real estate where the lease is for a longer period than one year, for
compensation or a commission.
(e) An agreement which by its terms is not to be performed during the lifetime of
the promisor.
(f) An agreement by a purchaser of real property to pay an indebtedness secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust upon the property purchased, unless assumption of
the indebtedness by the purchaser is specifically provided for in the conveyance
of the property.
(g) A contract, promise, undertaking, or commitment to loan money or to grant or
extend credit, in an amount greater than one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000),
not primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, made by a person en-
gaged in the business of lending or arranging for the lending of money or ex-
tending credit. For purposes of this section, a contract, promise, undertaking or
commitment to loan money secured solely by residential property consisting of
one to four dwelling units shall be deemed to be for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes.
This section does not apply to leases subject to Division 10 (commencing with Section 10101) of
the Commercial Code.
CAL. CIv. CODE. § 1624 (West Supp. 1996). In addition to the general statute of frauds, and
the U.C.C. provisions covering "transactions in goods," most American jurisdictions have
adopted the provisions of §§ 2A-201, 8-319, and 9-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code, re-
quiring writings, as a prerequisite for enforcement of contracts, for the lease of personal prop-
erty, purchase and sale of securities, or creation of a security interest in collateral not in the
possession of the secured party.
40. Louisiana has not adopted the U.C.C..
41. "Goods," as defined in California Uniform Commercial Code § 2105(l):
(1) ...means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Division 8) and things in
action. "Goods" also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops
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(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to
indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by
his authorized agent or broker.' A writing is not insufficient be-
cause it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the con-
tract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of
goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is re-
ceived and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it
satisfies the requirements of subdivision (1) against such party un-
less written notice of objection to its contents is given within 10
days after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subdivi-
sion (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) If the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary
course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice
of repudiation is received and under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has
made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture
or commitments for their procurement; or
and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods
to be severed from realty (Section 2107).
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them can
pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A
purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a
contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods.
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods is sufficiently
identified to be sold although the quantity of the bulk is not determined. Any
agreed proportion of such a bulk or any quantity thereof agreed upon by number,
weight or other measure may to the extent of the seller's interest in the bulk be
sold to the buyer who then becomes an owner in common.
(5) "Lot" means a parcel or a single article which is the subject matter of a sepa-
rate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the contract.
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a
single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its
character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single
article (as a machine) or a set of articles (as a suite offurniture or an assortment of
sizes) or a quantity (as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated in use or
in the relevant market as a single whole.
CAL. COM. CODE § 2105(1) (West 1964).
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(b) If the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his or her pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court that a
contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforce-
able under this provision beyond the quantity of goods
admitted; 42
(c) With respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted.
(Section 2606).43
A. Is the Transaction Exempt from the Statute of Frauds?
Invariably the question arises whether the statute of frauds is ap-
plicable to the contract in question. The monetary limitation on the
application of the statute is one means of taking a contract out of the
statute of frauds. The ten pounds sterling limit in the original statute
of frauds has been increased on numerous occasions since 1677; in
U.C.C. § 2201 the monetary limit for contracts involving "transactions
in goods" is $500.44 In the case of the Garage-IMS transaction, the
low monetary threshhold does not bar the applicability of the statute.
U.C.C. § 2201(3) contains a series of exemptions from its appli-
cation. These exemptions are of little help to Garage in the IMS-Ga-
rage transaction. The DRAMs and Intel 466 DX4-100 chips were not
specially manufactured for Garage (Section 2201(3)(a)), and one must
assume that in making the motion for summary judgment IMS has not
admitted in its pleadings the making of a contract with Garage (Sec-
tion 2201(3)(b)). The non-negotiation of the letter of credit would
seem to preclude application of Section 2201(3)(c), although argu-
ments could be made to the effect that the tender of a conditional letter
of credit, where prevention of satisfaction of the conditions is exclu-
sively within the control of the seller, is a form of payment satisfying
section 2201(3)(c).4'
42. California did not initially adopt § 2201(3)(b) of the Official Text. Section (b) was
added in 1988. Cal. Uniform Com. Code § 2201(3)(b) (West 1964) (Amended by Stats. 1988,
C.1368, § 8 (Supp. 1996)).
43. CAL-. CoM. CoDa § 2201 (West 1964 & Supp. 1996)
44. The predecessor Uniform Sales Act had a similar $500 limit. As a historic footnote, 10
Pounds Sterling in 1677 was a sum of far greater value than $500 today. Jonathan Swift's novel
Gulliver's Travels, written in 1726, makes reference to a 30 Pound Sterling grant to maintain
Gulliver's schooling for a year as a medical student at the University of Leyden. JONATHAN
Swn'r, GuLLrER's TtAvm.s 2 (G.P. Putnam's Sons 1887) (1726).
45. See Procyon Corp. v. Components Direct, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 409 (1988).
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B. Is This a Transaction in Goods?
The application of the U.C.C. § 2201 statute of frauds to the con-
tract between IMS and Garage also depends upon the proper charac-
terization of the subject matter of the contract. Does the contract
involve a "transaction in goods?" In the case of the Garage-IMS, it
was contemplated that there be a sale, and DRAM and CPU chips are
clearly within the definition of goods.4 6 Note, however, the presence
in the e-mail messages of reference to IMS' promise to deliver AMD's
CPU test software.
Many computer technology transactions involve licenses, rather
than sales. A license is neither a lease nor a sale; in the reported cases
a license is sometimes characterized as a "mere waiver of the right to
sue."47 The question is thus frequently presented whether a transac-
tion in which computer software changes hands is a "transaction in
goods" to which the Uniform Commercial Code applies.
It is often said that the courts look to the "essence of the agree-
ment" to determine whether the provision of the software predomi-
nates, and the transaction is thus a license, or whether the furnishing
of the software is only "incidental" to the sale of hardware, in which
case there is a "transaction in goods."48 In Advent Systems, Ltd. v.
Unisys Corp.,49 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that shrink-
wrapped computer software is a good within the Uniform Commercial
Code. The theory, as explained by the Third Circuit, is that:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but
once implanted in a medium are widely distributed to computer
owners. An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of
an orchestra rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of
46. To the extent that a transaction involving computer technology involves a sale of per-
sonal property, not involving the sale of "goods" to which § 2201 provides the applicable rule,
§ 1206 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides an alternate statute of frauds:
(1) Except in the cases described in subdivision (2) of this section a contract for
the sale of personal property is not enforceable by way of action or defense be-
yond five thousand dollars ($5,000) in amount or value of remedy unless there is
some writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made between the
parties at a defined or stated price, reasonably identifies the subject matter, and is
signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent.
U.C.C. § 1-206(1) (1996).
47. General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938). A
license has been also been described as the "lowest form of property transfer." Cohen v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr
Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d
1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
48. See, e.g., RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985).
49. 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991).
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musicians and in itself is not a "good," but when transferred to a
laser-readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity.
Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not a good, but,
when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.50
In the Garage-IMS transaction it seems clear that the parties to the
purported agreement contemplated only the incidental licensing of the
AMD test software, and the transaction is predominately a "transac-
tion in goods."
C. The Presence of Copyrighted Software in the Transaction
Mention should be made of the special statute of frauds contained
in Section 204 of the Copyright Act. Section 204 provides:
(a) A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of
law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or
memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner
of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent.
(b) A certificate of acknowledgement is not required for the valid-
ity of a transfer, but is prima facie evidence of the execution of the
transfer if -
(1) in the case of a transfer executed in the United States, the
certificate is issued by a person authorized to administer oaths
within the United States; or
(2) in the case of a transfer executed in a foreign country, the
certificate is issued by a diplomatic or consular office of the
United States, or by a person authorized to administer oaths
whose authority is proved by a certificate of such an officer.51
Confirmation that this copyright "statute of frauds" requires that
there be a writing to convey an ownership or other interest in the
copyright itself is found in Konigsberg Int'l. Inc. v. Rice.52 In Konigs-
berg, the court considered the validity of a joint venture formed be-
tween the author Anne Rice and the Hollywood producers for the
creation of certain works. No writing was ever executed conveying
ownership or any other interest in copyrights to the joint venture. The
plaintiffs, Hollywood producers, contended that they acquired an own-
ership interest in the copyrights by oral agreement with defendant
Rice. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found otherwise:
50. Id. at 675. See generally, Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the U.C.C., 77
MICH. L. REV. 1149 (1979).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 204 (1988). The copyright law requirement of a written agreement estab-
lishing the transfer of property rights in a copyright has a counterpart in the patent law. See 35
U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
52. 16 F.3d 355, 357 (9th Cir. 1994).
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In Effects i,[53] we stated that the writing must ensure that the
author "will not give away his copyright inadvertently" and "forces
a party who wants to use the copyrighted work to negotiate with the
creator to determine precisely what rights are being transferred and
at what price." The writing should also serve as a guidepost for the
parties to resolve their disputes: "Rather than look to the courts
every time they disagree as to whether a particular use of the work
violates their mutual understanding, parties need only look to the
writing that sets out their respective rights." To serve these func-
tions, the writing in question must, at the very least, be executed
more or less contemporaneously with the agreement and must be a
product of the parties' negotiations.
Although section 204 is often referred to as the "copyright
statute of frauds," it actually differs materially from state statutes of
frauds. While the latter may be satisfied by a writing not intended
as a memorandum of contract, not communicated to the other party,
and even made in pleadings or testimony years after the alleged
agreement, section 204 may not. State statutes of frauds serve a
purely evidentiary function - to prevent enforcement through fraud
or perjury of fictitious agreements. Thus, agreements subject to
statutes of frauds may be perfectly valid, yet unenforceable without
evidence of a writing.
By contrast, a transfer of copyright is simply "not valid" with-
out a writing. Section 204's writing requirement not only protects
authors from fraudulent claims, but also "enhances predictability
and certainty of ownership" - 'Congress's paramount goal' when it
revised the Act in 1976." 54
No transfer of an ownership interest in the copyright in the AMD
software was contemplated in the IMS-Garage transaction, so Section
204 of the Copyright Act does not apply.
53. Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Danforth v.
Cohen, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991).
54. Konigsberg Int'l. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355, at 356-57 (citations omitted). Judge Kozinski
found that state law notions of equitable estoppel, part performance, and the like had no applica-
tion to the statute of frauds contained in Copyright Act § 204.
Rice's letter was written three and a half years after the alleged oral agreement, a
year and a half after its alleged term would have expired and 6 months into a
contentious lawsuit. Thus, it was not substantially contemporaneous with the oral
agreement. Nor was it a product of the parties' negotiations; it came far too late
to provide any reference point for the parties' license disputes. In short, Rice's
letter-though ill-advised-was not the type of writing contemplated by section
204 as sufficient to effect a transfer of the copyright to THE MUMMY.
In sum, Konigsberg, Sanitsky and Rice did lunch, not contracts.
Id. at 357-58.
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D. The International Character of the Transaction Does Not
Bar Application of Section 2201
Given the international character of the IMS-Garage transaction,
does the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale Of Goods (UNCISG) supply the rule of law applicable to
the IMS-Garage transaction? UNCISG governs contracts for the sale
of goods between parties whose places of business are in different
contracting states. 5 Parties in those contracting states may expressly
preclude the application of the Convention by appropriate contract
language 56 and may provide that writings are required to modify con-
tracts that are themselves in writing.57
The pertinent part of the UNCISG for present purposes is Article
11, which provides that "A contract of sale need not be concluded in
or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other requirement as
to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses."58
Under the UNCISG it would seem that any contract made by e-mail
communication, 59 between parties whose places of business are con-
tracting states, is enforceable without regard to the character of the
writing.6
0
55. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art.
l(1)(a), 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) [hereinafter UNCISGI. See generally, Arthur Fakes, The
Application of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
to Computer, Software, and Database Transactions, 3 Sot'rwm LJ. 559 (1990). UNCISG
article 1(1)(b) allows application of the Convention where the rules of private international law
would lead to the application of the law of a contracting state. This article is not in effect in the
United States as a result of the reservation contained in the United States instrument of
ratification.
Contracts for the supply of services or labor, for goods where the contracting party supplies
predominately labor or services, or goods to be manufactured or produced by a party from mater-
ials substantially supplied by the other party, are excluded from the UNCISG by articles 3(l) and
3(2).
56. UNCISG, supra note 55, art. 6.
57. Id art. 29.
58. Id. art. 11.
59. Article 13 specifically defines a writing as including telex and telegram. Id. art. 13.
60. The provisions of article 11 do not apply where a party has his place of business in a
contracting state that has made a declaration under article 96 of the Convention. Article 96
provides that:
[a] contracting state whose legislation requires contracts of sale to be concluded in
or evidenced by writing may at any time make a declaration in accordance with
article 12 that any provision in article 11, article 29, or Part II of this Convention,
that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or
any offer, acceptance, or other indication of intention to be made in any form
other than in writing, does not apply where any party has his place of business in
that State.
UNCISG, supra note 55, art. 96. Countries having made such reservations include Argentina,
Chile, China, Hungary, and the Russian Federation.
HAS HAL SIGNED A CONTRACT
Singapore was not a UNCISG contracting state at the time of the
hypothetical events.61 Therefore, the UNCISG does not apply to the
IMS-Garage contract.62
VI. GOD HATH WROUGHT WRITINGS SUFFICIENT UNDER
THE STATUTE
Given the applicability of the U.C.C. to the transaction between
IMS and Garage, Garage must demonstrate that the e-mail messages
transmitted over the Internet between Fred Smith's computer and
Andy Acquisition's computer satisfy the writing and subscription re-
quirements of U.C.C. § 2201(1). The case law regarding e-mail
messages, and to what extent they satisfy the U.C.C. statute of frauds,
is non-existent. The closest analogy seems to be the 19th century
predecessor to e-mail: the telegram.
Samuel F. B. Morse's May, 1844 telegram message, "What Hath
God Wrought,"63 did not take long to have its impact in the courts of
law.64 In what may be the earliest case on record, the 1856 case of
Durkee v. Vermont Cent. R.R.,65 an action was brought to recover
commissions earned by the plaintiff for his services in the negotiation
of a loan to the defendants. Plaintiff Durkee found a lender Holbrook,
and requested authorization from his principals at the railroad to con-
clude loan negotiations with Holbrook. In response to the request for
authority to conclude the loan, Durkee received a telegram from Peck,
who had been authorized to act on behalf of the defendant railroad:
"Mr. Harrison Durkee, Saratoga: Yes; effect it with Holbrook. Signed
John H. Peck." The Vermont Supreme Court viewed the issue as turn-
ing on proper proof of the telegram containing the contractual
commitment:
In regard to the proof offered to establish telegraphic communica-
tions, it seems to us that where such communications are relied
upon to establish contracts, where their force and effect will depend
61. Singapore was a signatory to the original Vienna text and ratified the Convention on
February 16, 1995. However, the convention only came into effect in Singapore on March 1,
1996.
62. It is possible that a court could find the contract governed by the law of Singapore, on
choice of law principles. Singapore law was not reviewed to determine whether there is a statute
of frauds applicable to the transaction.
63. The words of the prophet Balaam, "What God Hath Wrought," were chosen by Annie
Ellsworth, daughter of U.S. Commissioner of Patents, for transmission at the offical May 24,
1844, opening of Morse's Washington to Baltimore Telegraph Line. See L. SPRAGUE DE CAMP,
THE HEROIC AGE OF AmrmcAN INIVENON 71 (1961).
64. For a brief history of the development of the law applicable to the telegraph, see LEs-
TaR G. LNDLEY, THE IMPACT oF nm TELEGRAPH ON CONTRACT LAW (1990).
65. 29 Vt. 127 (1856).
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upon the terms used, they must be proved in the same manner other
writings, as in letters and contracts, are. For a telegraphic commu-
nication is ordinarily in writing, in the vernacular, at both ends of
the line, and must of necessity be so at the last end, unless the
person to whom it is addressed is in the office at the time, which is
sometimes the fact. In such case, if the communication were never
reduced to writing, it could only be proved like other matter resting
in parol, by the recollection of witnesses in whose hearing it was
repeated. In regard to the particular end of the line where inquiry is
first to be made for the original, it depends upon which party is
responsible for the transmission across the line, or in other words,
whose agent the telegraph is. The first communication in a transac-
tion, if it is all negotiated across the wires, will only be effective in
the form in which it reaches its destination. In such case inquiry
should first be made for the very dispatch delivered. In default of
that, its contents may be shown by the next best proof. If the
course of business is, as in the cites, to preserve copies of all
messages received in books kept for that purpose, a copy might
readily be obtained which would ordinarily be regarded as better
proof than the mere recollection of a witness. And according to the
early English and the American practice, the party is bound to pro-
duce a copy of the original, (that being lost,) when in his power,
and known a sufficient time before the trial to enable him to do so.
And perhaps if no copy of such message is preserved, but the
original message ordered to be sent is preserved, that should be
produced, although this were not strictly the original in the case, the
letter delivered, which was the original, being lost.
But where the party to whom the communication is made is to
take the risk of transmission, the message delivered to the operator
is the original, and that is to be produced, or the nearest approach to
it by way of copy or otherwise.6
6
In Trevor v. Wood,67 another early case, the parties, dealers in
bullion and currency, agreed in advance to deal by telegraph. Trevor
& Colgate sent a telegram to Wood & Co. accepting Wood & Co.'s
offer to sell Mexican dollars. Between the Wood & Co. offer and
Wood & Co.'s receipt of Trevor's telegraphed acceptance four days
passed "because of some derangement of the line." In that four day
period the price moved, and Wood & Co. refused to ship the currency.
When suit was brought, Wood & Co. acknowledged sending a tele-
gram putting the Mexican dollars on offer, but denied that this was a
writing. The Court held otherwise.
66. Id. at 140-41 (citations omitted).
67. 93 Am. Dec. 511 (N.Y. 1867).
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It was agreed between these parties that their business should be
transacted through the medium of the telegraph. The object of this
agreement was to substitute the telegraph for other methods of
communication, and to give to their transactions by it the same
force and validity they would derive if they had been performed
through other agencies. In accordance with this agreement, the of-
fer was made by telegraph to the appellants in New York, and the
acceptance addressed to the respondents in New Orleans, and im-
mediately dispatched from New York by order of the appellants. It
cannot, therefore be said that the appellants did not put their accept-
ance in a proper way to be communicated to the respondents, for
they adopted the method of communication which had been used in
the transaction by the respondents, and which had been selected by
prior agreement between them as that by means of which their busi-
ness should be transacted. Under these circumstances the sending
of the dispatch must be regarded as an acceptance of the respon-
dents' offer and thereupon the contract became complete.68
By 1946 courts were stating that "[iut is well established that a
telegram satisfies the requirements of the statute of frauds."69
VII. THE MuLTrPLICITY OF E-MAIL MESSAGES
A number of the cases involving telegrams considered whether a
telegram of acceptance was required to state all of the contract terms.
The rule developed early on was that a telegram of acceptance need
not state all of the terms. The contract would be taken out of the
operation of the statute of frauds. Issues concerning both the intent to
contract and the sufficiency and specificity of the contract terms
would be resolved by proof of a series of writings that included
telegrams.
Did the papers which passed between the parties, constituting the
memorandum of the transation [sic], contain such a description of
the lands in dispute as was sufficient, in connection with extrinsic
evidence not contradictory of nor adding to the written description,
to meet the requirements of the Michigan statute of frauds? We say
68. Id. at 513. See also Farmers' Produce Co. v. McAlester Storage & Comm'n. Co., 150
P. 483, 485 (Okla. 1915).
69. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 126 n.13 (S.D. Cal. 1948),
motion for new trial granted, 89 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev'd, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951) and 344 U.S. 829 (1952). It is not so well established,
however, that the aberrational decision does not come along, as in Pike Indus. v. Middlebury
Assocs., 398 A.2d 280, 281-82 (Vt. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 947 (1982) (where the Ver-
mont Supreme Court has difficulty explaining how the sending of a telegram stating "you are
directed to bill [guarantor] directly for the work performed and you are authorized to perform all
necessary overtime to complete your work by Sunday, Oct. 20, 1974" was insufficient under the
statute of frauds).
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'the papers,' because the principle is well established that a com-
plete contract, binding under the statute of frauds, may be gathered
from letters, writings, and telegrams between the parties relating to
the subject-matter of the contract, and so connected with each other
that they may be fairly said to constitute one paper relating to the
contract.
70
In Gibson v. De La Salle Institute7' the plaintiff alleged that a
contract for the purchase and sale of wine was formed as a result of
the exchange of telegrams between plaintiff and defendant. The de-
fendant contended that the enforcement of any such contract was
barred by the statute of frauds. The trial court struck from the record
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the sending of the tele-
grams with the result that the agreement was held unenforceable by
reason of the statute of frauds. The California Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that a contract can be established through proof of the
circumstances surrounding the exchange of telegrams, where those
circumstances and the telegrams identify the parties to the contract,
the terms of the agreement, and whether those terms are sufficient to
constitute an enforceable contract.
In Brewer v. Horst & Lachmund Co.,7" the question was also the
sufficiency of the exchange of telegrams. In Brewer the statute of
frauds was deemed to be satisfied by the fact of the sending of a tele-
gram of acceptance in response to the telegram of offer:
The two telegrams bear the same date; on their face the last one
was sent to plaintiff in response to the first; and it is clear that they
should be read together to determine whether they constitute a note
or a memorandum required by the statute of frauds. We are satis-
fied that the telegrams, thus read by the light of the circumstances
surrounding the parties, are sufficient to take the contract out of the
statute of frauds. Any other conclusion than the one here reached
would certainly impair the usefulness of modem appliances to
modem business, tend to hamper trade, and increase the expense
thereof.73
70. Ryan v. United States, 136 U.S. 68, 83 (1890). See also, e.g., Cook v. Young, 269
S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Breckinridge v. Crocker, 21 P. 179 (Cal. 1889); Crabtree v.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551 (N.Y. 1953).
71. 152 P.2d 774 (Cal. App. 1944).
72. 60 P. 418 (Cal. 1900).
73. Il at 420 (citations omitted). See also Clipper Maritime Ltd. v. Shiristar Container
Tramp. Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 546 [Q.B. (Com. Ct.) 1987].
[Vol. 12-280
HAS HAL SIGNED A CONTRACT
Vin. THE E-MA MESSAGE IS SIGNED
The early writers on the subject of telegrams took the view that
the longhand writing on the telegram form, delivered to the telegra-
pher with a request that the text be transmitted, satisfied the statute of
frauds when the text was then transmitted in Morse code to the recipi-
ent or telegraph office nearest the recipient.74 In one fanciful passage,
the court viewed the telegraph operator's key as a thousand-mile long
steel pen.
So when a contract is made by telegraph, which must be in writing
by the statute of frauds, if the parties authorize their agents either in
writing or by parol, to make a proposition on one side and the other
party accepts it through the telegraph, that constitutes a contract in
writing under the statute of frauds; because each party authorizes
his agents, the company or the company's operator, to write for
him; and it makes no difference whether that operator writes the
offer or the acceptance in the presence of his principal and by his
express direction, with a steel pen an inch long attached to an ordi-
nary penholder, or whether his pen be a copper wire a thousand
miles long. In either case the thought is communicated to the paper
by the use of the finger resting upon the pen; nor does it make any
difference that in one case common record ink is used, while in the
other case a more subtle fluid, known as electricity, performs the
same office.75
Where the text of the telegram was orally dictated to the telegrapher,
rather than written out or typed, the view was adopted that the tele-
graph company was the agent of the author,76 and the writing require-
ment was satisfied by the telegram itself which was "written" by the
sender's agent.77 "[T]he manipulations of [the operator] by which the
defendant's name became appended to the dispatch were his own, and
were equivalent to an actual personal signing of his name with pen
and ink."78
In A & G Construction Co. v. Reid Bros. Logging Co.,79 the
question was whether the writing was sufficient under the U.C.C..
The writing did not contain a personal signature: rather the words
Glenn W. Reid were typed at the end of the letter. The Alaska
74. See MoRmis GRAY, A TPREATiSE ON COMMUNICATION BY TELEGRAPH 245-46 (1885).
75. Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487, 488 (1869).
76. In some instances the telegraph company may be the common agent of both parties.
WILLiAM L. Scorr & MiLToN P. JARNAGIN, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPHS 331-32
(1868).
77. GRAY, supra note 74, at 247-48.
78. Dunning & Smith v. Roberts, 35 Barb. 463, 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862).
79. 547 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1976).
1996]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court held that the typed words satisfied the requirements of
Alaska Statute 45.05.050 (U.C.C. § 2201). The Court adopted the
view that the U.C.C.'s signing requirement turns on authentication,
and concluded that an authenticated "signature" 80 may be "printed,
stamped or written; it may be by initials or thumbprint. It may be on
any part of the document and in appropriate cases, may be found in a
billhead or letterhead." 81
Reid Bros. is typical of the modem cases, where the focus of
attention is on intent to authenticate, coupled with the use of a symbol,
mark or other device affixed to the document with that intent. Thus in
Hansen v. Hill,2 the question was whether the name typed on a tele-
gram constituted the required signature:
We come now to the question of whether there was a valid sub-
scription. The telegram to which the seller defendant's name has
been affixed may be considered as having been signed by the de-
fendant Donald W. Hill within the meaning of the statute of frauds.
"The signing of a paper-writing or instrument is the affixing of
one's name thereto, with the purpose or intent to identify the paper
or instrument, or to give it effect as one's act."
This is usually accomplished when a person affixes his name
in his own handwriting; in such case the very fact clearly evidences
the intent of the signer. Affixing one's handwritten signature, how-
ever, is not the only method by which a paper writing may be con-
sidered as being signed within the meaning of the statute of frauds.
As long ago as Lord Ellenborough's opinion in Schneider and An-
other against Norris, 2 M. & S. 286, 105 Eng. Rep. 388 (1814), it
has been recognized that a printed name may constitute a sufficient
signing under the statute of frauds, provided that it is recognized by
the party sought to be charged. The courts of this country have
generally recognized that principle.
The above view has been adopted in the Restatement of Con-
tracts § 210 (1932), which provides that the signature to a memo-
randum under the statute may be in writing or printed and need not
be subscribed at the foot of the memorandum, but must be made or
adopted with the declared or apparent intent of authenticating the
memorandum as that of the signer.
80. The U.C.C. gives special definitions of "signed" and "writing." "Signed" includes
"any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing."
U.C.C. § 1-201(39). "Written" or "writing" includes "printing, typewriting or any other inten-
tional reduction to tangible form." U.C.C. § 1-201(46).
81. 547 P.2d at 1216 (quoting U.C.C. § 1-201 (official comment)). See, e.g., Benedict v.
Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965).
82. 340 N.W.2d 8 (Neb. 1983).
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In Heffernan v. Keith, 127 So.2d 903 (Fla. App. 1961), the
court, in answering the defendant's contention that the telegram
was not sufficient under the statute because it was not a signed
copy, indicated that the defendant's admissions of having sent the
telegram amounted to acquiescence.
In the late case of Hillstrom v. Gosnay, Mont., 614 P.2d 466
(1980) the court, on facts nearly identical to those confronting the
court in this particular case, ruled that a telegram may constitute
sufficient written memorandum to satisfy the requirements of the
statute of frauds, and also ruled that a typewritten signature on a
telegram is proper subscription within the meaning of the statute of
frauds, provided that the necessary intent to authenticate is
shown.8 3
The "signature" need not be in any particular form or location. 4
In Brown v. The Butchers & Drovers' BankO5 a bill of exchange en-
dorsed with the figures 1.2.8, written in lead pencil, was held suffi-
cient: "[A] person may become bound by any mark or designation he
thinks proper to adopt, provided it is used as a substitute for his name,
and he intend to bind himself."8" Code words adopted by prearrange-
ment,8 7 stationery containing a business letterhead,88 and purchase or-
der forms with the firm name at the top, 9 have all be held to satisfy
the "signed" requirement of the statute of frauds. Hand markings on a
notepad9 ° and a handwritten "X"91 have been held sufficient. InClark
v. Coats & Suits Unlimited,92 the court held that a typewritten memo-
randum, addressed in the To: From: style of business memoranda,
83. kL at 12-13 (citations omitted). See also Joseph Martinelli & Co. v. L. Gillarde Co.,
73 F. Supp. 293 (D. Mass, 1947), vacated, 168 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1948), modified, 169 F.2d 60
(1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948).
84. Vess Beverages, Inc. v. Paddington Corp., 886 F.2d 208, 213 (8th Cir. 1989) ("The
signature may take many forms and be located anywhere in the writing, so long as it conveys an
intention to authenticate the writing. Whether a particular 'signature' was intended to authenti-
cate a document is a question of fact." (Citations omitted)).
85. 6 Hill 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1844).
86. Il at 444.
87. Bibb v. Allen, 149 U.S. 481, 494 (1893).
88. Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing Co., 355 F.2d 114, 118
(3d Cir. 1965):
[I]t is also admitted that Big Wheel received invoices for the sales in question
which contained the letterhead of Associated, the quantity and price terms. Be-
cause it is clear that the parties were "merchants" within U.C.C. sales article; and
since no written objections were sent within ten days of receipt, statute of frauds
was satisfied.
89. See Pearlberg v. Levisohn, 182 N.Y.S. 615, 617-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1920).
90. Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp., 110 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (N.Y. 1953).
91. See, e.g., Zacharie v. Franklin, 37 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1838).
92. 352 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. App. 1984).
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could satisfy the signing requirement of the Michigan statute of
frauds.
The memorandum purports to be "From Ted Goldsmith". As stated
by Professor Corbin, the manner and means used to inscribe the
signature are a "question of intention to authenticate". Plaintiff,
therefore, should be permitted to present evidence to show that Ted
Goldsmith sent plaintiff the memorandum and that Ted Goldsmith
intended to authenticate the document when sent, thus satisfying
the signature requirement of the statute of frauds. Furthermore, if it
can be shown that Ted Goldsmith sent plaintiff the memorandum
and he intended to authenticate such, a question of fact remains on
the issue of whether or not Ted Goldsmith signed the memorandum
in his individual capacity, as an agent of the remaining defendants,
or both. Because several questions of fact exist, it is our opinion
that the trial court improperly granted accelerated judgment on the
ground that the memorandum did not satisfy the writing require-
ment of the statute of frauds. Thus, we find it necessary to reverse
the court's order and remand for trial on this issue.93
In Hessenthaler v. Farzin,94 the Farzins engaged real estate
agents to sell their property. An offer of sale was drawn up by the
93. I& at 354. In Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, the question was whether a contract was
created between the parties when the terms of the contract were recorded on audiotape. The case
arose out of the impending bankruptcy of a meat. packing company. Ellis agreed to provide
financing to the meat packing company, owned by Bernstein. The financing contemplated the
filing of a Chapter 11 Plan. A meeting was held to confirm the arrangements between the parties
and the details of the Chapter II agreement. The parties reached agreement but agreed there was
no time to put the agreement in writing. The lawyer for Ellis then agreed with Bernstein that
their statement of the terms of the agreement should be tape recorded. The Court held that the
statute of frauds provisions of U.C.C. § 8319, regarding the sale of securities, were satisfied by
the tape recording. 348 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Colo. 1972).
We think and we hold that when the parties to an oral contract agree that the oral
contract shall be tape recorded, the contract is "reduced to tangible form" when it
is placed on the tape. We do not overlook the requirement for signature contained
in the statute, but the clear purpose of this is to require identification of the con-
tracting party, and where, as here, the identity of the oral contractors is estab-
lished, and, in fact, admitted, the tape itself is enough. So, we hold that even if
the signed correspondence is insufficient to get around the statute [which it isn't],
the tape recording of the oral contract would be a "reduction to tangible form"
under the provisions of the U.C.C. Probably the opposite result would be required
under historical statutes of frauds which do not contain the tangible form language
of this somewhat unusual definition of the word "written." However, under this
statute, we think the tape recorded agreement meets the requirements.
Id. at 1228. See also Londono v. Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1228 n.4 (I1th Cir. 1985) ("As for
the first contention, the tape recording of the City Commission's action at the meeting satisfies
the statute of frauds requirements of a signed writing."); contra, Swink & Co. v. Carroll McEn-
tee & McGinley, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 393 (Ark. 1979). In another case, conduct was held to be
sufficient to constitute a signature. Interstate United Corp. v. White, 388 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cit.
1967).
94. 564 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. 1989).
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purchasers and sent to the sellers. The purchasers told the sellers that
if they wished to accept the offer a telegram should be sent. The sell-
ers sent a mailgram confirming their acceptance, and the purchasers
mailed an agreement for signature. The sellers defaulted and the pur-
chasers sued for specific performance. The issue on appeal was
whether there was a memorandum sufficient to satisfy the statute of
frauds, the sellers never having signed the written contract tendered
after the sending of the mailgram in purported acceptance of the offer.
The first question we must decide is whether or not the mailgram
[sellers] sent to Dougherty [buyer] constitutes a "signed" writing as
contemplated by the statute. Neither our research nor that of the
parties has revealed any Pennsylvania cases that address the issue
of whether or not a mailgram can be sufficient to satisfy the statute.
A consideration of the purpose served by the statute, however, con-
vinces us that the mailgram that was sent in this case is sufficient to
constitute a signed writing.95
In a footnote, the court in Hessenthaler stated that, "Although the is-
sue is one of first impression in Pennsylvania, these types of questions
are likely to arise with greater frequency in the future, as businesses
and individuals increasingly rely on similar methods of negotiation
such as electronic mail, telexes and facsimile machines in conducting
their business affairs."96
The Hessenthaler court stated that the question was whether the
signature requirement had been satisfied. According to the court, the
focus was on whether there was some reliable indication that the party
to be charged under the writing intended to authenticate it. "[T]here is
no requirement in the Statute or the decisional law that a signature be
in any particular form. Instead, the focus has been on whether there is
some reliable indication that the person to be charged with performing
under the writing intended to authenticate it."' 97 Referring to a series
of earlier cases, the court in Hessenthaler ruled that the proper ap-
proach was to look to the reliability of the memorandum, judged by
the circumstances attending its preparation, its content, and its external
appearance. In the particular case at hand, the court felt that the mail-
gram constituted a signed writing because its content suggested little
question of its reliability. The authors of the mailgram identified
themselves, they made certain that their intention be clearly under-
stood by declaring their acceptance, and they identified the terms and
conditions of the performance of the acceptance.
95. lML at 992 (footnotes omitted).
96. Id. n.3.
97. lId at 993.
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In light of the primary declaration of identity, combined with the
inclusion of the precise terms of the agreement, we are satisfied
that the mailgram sufficiently reveals appellants' intention to adopt
the writing as their own, and thus is sufficient to constitute a
"signed" writing for purposes of the Statute.98
IX. THE TELEX ARRIVES
In the twentieth century the telegram gradually gave way to the
telex machine, allowing each user to have direct access to every other
user with a telex machine.99 The telex machine gave rise to familiar
issues, such as whether, where and when the contract was formed.
In the Denunzio case,'00 the parties conceded that "teletype
messages do not bear the signature in writing of the party to be
charged in the sense that they were not literally signed with pen and
ink in the ordinary signature of the sender."' 01 Examining the early
cases holding that any mark or sign written or placed on an instrument
of writing with the intent to execute or authenticate the writing suf-
ficed for purposes of the signature requirement, the Denunzio court
concluded that it:
[M]ust take a realistic view of modem business practices, and can
probably take judicial notice of the extensive use to which the tele-
type machine is being used today among business firms, particu-
larly brokers, in the expeditious transmission of typewritten
messages. No case in point has been called to the court's attention
on this particular point, and a diligent search of the authorities has
failed to uncover the status of teletype machines as satisfying the
California Statute of Frauds. The point appears to be a res nova,
98. Ild. at 994. Other modem cases demonstrate the focus on intent. See, e.g., State v.
Watts, 222 S.E.2d 389, 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (quoting Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425 P.2d
773 (1967):
In regard to a signature, it is the intent rather than the form of the act that is
important. While one's signature is usually made by writing his name, the same
purpose can be accomplished by placing any writing, indicia or symbol which the
signer chooses to adopt and use as his signature and by which it may be proved:
e.g., by finger or thumb prints, by cross or other mark, or by any type of mechani-
cally reproduced or stamped facsimile of his signature, as effectively as by his
own handwriting.
99. Computers can be programmed to act like telex machines, and have considerable ad-
vantage compared to the conventional telex both in the method of composition of messages and
in the elimination of the unwieldy punched paper tape used in transmission.
100. Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 128 (S.D. Cal. 1948), motion for
new trial granted, 89 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev'd, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951) and 344 U.S. 829 (1952).
101. 79 F. Supp. at 128.
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but this court will hold that the teletype messages in this case satis-
fied the Statute of Frauds in California.102
The significance of the Denunzio case lies in its reliance upon the use
of symbols or code letters as identifying the sender and recipient and
as authenticating the document.
The issue of where, for purposes of jurisdiction, a contract is
made when the contract is formed by an exchange of telexes was
raised in Entores, Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp. °3 There Lord Den-
ning held that the instantaneous communications rule - the contract is
formed when the acceptance is communicated and received - applied
to contracts formed by telex communications as well as those con-
tracts made over the telephone or shouted across rivers and crowded
rooms. Thus, for purposes of jurisdiction and venue statutes the con-
tract is deemed formed at the place of receipt. Lord Denning noted
that American decisions have often applied the post office "drop box"
rule to telex communications - the contract is formed when the ac-
ceptance is placed in the mail - but thought the American decisions
wrongly decided." 4
In Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl und Stahlwarenhandelsgesell-
schaft mbH,'05 the House of Lords approved the Entores rule, holding
that telex communications were governed by the "instantaneous com-
munications" rule, while letters and telegrams were governed by the
"drop box" rule. 10 6 Lord Wilburforce did concede, however, that the
instantaneous communications rule, even when applied to telex
messages, had its limitations:
Since 1955 the use of telex communication has been greatly
expanded, and there are many variants on it. The senders and re-
cipients may not be the principals to the contemplated contract.
They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The
message may not reach, or be intended to reach, the designated
recipient immediately: messages may be sent out of office hours, or
at night, with the intention, or on the assumption, that they will be
read at a later time. There may be some error or default at the
recipient's end which prevents receipt at the time contemplated and
believed by the sender. The message may have been sent and/or
received through machines operated by third persons. Any many
other variations may occur. No universal rule can over all such
cases; they must be resolved by reference to the intentions of the
102. Ma at 128-29.
103. 2 All E.R. 493 (C.A. 1955).
104. l t at 496.
105. 1 All E.R. 293 (House of Lords 1982).
106. Ua at 297.
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parties, by sound business practice and in some cases by a judg-
ment where the risks should lie.1
07
X. JUST THE FAX
The facsimile (fax) machine was invented in 1843,108 just after
the introduction of the telegraph. For years fax languished due to lack
of standardization. Now, with standardization through CCITT, near
universal compatibility has been achieved, and fax machines are a sta-
ple of commerce. In the United States, there are an estimated six mil-
lion fax machines, supplemented by an estimated one million fax
boards in desktop computers. The number of transmitted pages soared
from 1.5 billion in 1985 to 17 billion in 1991.'09
The effect of a document transmitted by fax has received some
attention in the courts. In Calabrese v. Springer Personnel of New
York, Inc.'10 interrogatories were served on defendants pursuant to a
court order requiring answers within twenty days. Defendants re-
ceived the copy of the interrogatories transmitted by fax, but rejected
them as not being served in compliance with the requirements of local
law. When the answers were not received within the twenty days after
service by facsimile, but rather eight days later, plaintiff moved for
sanctions. The question presented turned on whether the copy was
received during business hours:
Perhaps, literally reading Rule # 2103(b(3) CPLR, there could
now ensue controversy as to whether the recipient's office is open,
whether anyone is in charge, and whether the fax machine is in a
conspicuous place. I refuse, however, to engage in such Augustin-
ian folly. Of course the office is open when the fax machine is
receiving. If an operator is present, of course there is delivery. If
no operator is present, of course the fax machine, which is visited
regularly, is in a conspicuous place. Faxing patently satisfied the
plain intent of the subsection. Any other interpretation would war
with the canon of construction contained in Section # 104 CPLR,
and would justify the blunt observation about the Law which
Charles Dickens put in the mouth of Mr. Bumble in Oliver
Twist. 11
In Beatty v. First Exploration Fund 1987 and Company,"2 re-
spondent partnership gave notice of a partnership meeting, and sent
107. Id. at 296.
108. See Jonathan Coopersrnith, Facsimile's False Start, IEEE SPECTRUM, Feb. 1993, at 46.
109. Id. at 48.
110. 534 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1988).
111. d at 84.
112. 25 B.C.L.R.2d 377 (1988).
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the limited partners a form of proxy for use at the meeting. To be
effective, the partnership agreement required delivery of the executed
proxy to the partnership prior to the meeting. Some of the proxies
were returned by fax. The chairman refused to count the ballots cast
by proxy, and declared the motion at hand passed. Suit was then filed
by plaintiffs, who contended that if the proxies sent by fax were
counted the motion would have been defeated. The court found the
proxies valid:
It was argued by counsel for the Fund that validating faxed proxies
would increase the risk of fraud, create uncertainty, and give an
unfair advantage to those limited partners who had access to a
telecopier or fax machine. I reject that argument. Faxed proxies
are, in effect, a photocopy of an original proxy. They reveal what
is depicted on an original proxy, including an exact replica of the
signature of the person who signed the original proxy. I observe no
greater opportunity for the perpetration of a fraud by the use of
faxed proxies than by the use of original proxies. The same obser-
vation applies to the matter of uncertainty.1 13
The facsimile has been analogized to the telex for purposes of
determining where, and when, a contact has been formed. In Gunac
Hawkes Bay (1986) Ltd. v. Palmer,"4 a New Zealand court held that,
for purpose of the New Zealand contract venue statute, the instantane-
ous nature of the facsimile communication led to the conclusion that a
contract is formed at the time and place where the communication is
received.' 5 In two Canadian cases, Joan Balcom Sales Inc. v. Poi-
rier"I6 and Rolling v. Willann Investments Ltd.,' 1 7 the courts held that
a contract was formed in the county of receipt, where the facsimile
was received. In Asher v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,"' a Queen's Bench
court held that the Entores rule, developed for telexes, also applied to
faxes, and ruled that a contract formed by exchange of facsimile trans-
mission is created at the location of the facsimile machine where the
acceptance is received." 9
113. I& at 385.
114. 3 N.Z.L.R. 297 (High Court 1991).
115. lId at 302-03.
116. 28 A.C.W.S.3d 551 (N. S. County Ct. 1991).
117. 63 D.L.R.4th 760 (Ont. Ct. App. 1989).
118. Q.B. Oct. 21, 1991.
119. In Clipper Maritime LtUd v. Shirlstar Container Transp. Ltd, Justice Staughton ques-
tioned whether the statute of frauds would "still be applicable in the world of telex, telephone
and fax." 1 Lloyd's Rep. 546 [Q.B. (Corn. Ct.) 1987].
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XI. THE LAW OF COMPUTER EVIDENCE
The foregoing analysis indicates that a California court hearing
the Garage v. IMS dispute should find that the writing and signature
requirements of the UCC statute of frauds satisfied by proof of the e-
mail messages between Andy Acquisition and Fred Smith. To prove
the creation of the contract the e-mail message must be introduced into
evidence.
Modem trial technique emphasizes the use of documentary evi-
dence. Juries generally view documents as more trustworthy, and
more deserving of belief, than oral testimony. The policies behind the
statute of frauds, emphasizing documents and writings showing that a
party agreed to be bound in contract as a means of insuring reliable
evidence and legal rulings, have thus come full circle.
When Garage offers the Fred Smith e-mail message in evidence
at the trial, or arguments arise concerning its admissibility in a sum-
mary judgment proceeding, the questions that need to be addressed are
as follows:
1. Is the document a writing?1 20
2. Has the writing been properly authenticated? 121
3. If the original122 is not available, may a duplicate1 3 be offered
into evidence under an exception to the best evidence rule?124
120. "'Writing' means handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and
every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or represen-
tation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof." CAL.
EVID. CODE § 250 (West 1996). A tape recording of a telephone conversation, for example, is a
"writing" within the meaning of California Evidence Code § 250. See People v. Estrada, 155
Cal. Rptr. 731 (1979). Motion pictures and phonograph records are also "writings." See People
v. Enskat, 98 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1971); People v. Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 986 (1977).
121. See CAL. Evro. CODE § 1400 (West 1996).
122. "Original" means the writing itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect
by a person executing or issuing it. An "original" of a photograph includes the negative or any
print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other output
readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an "original." CAL. EvID. CODE § 255
(West 1996).
123. A "duplicate" is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by
mechanical or electronic rerecording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent tech-
nique which accurately reproduces the original. CAL. EvrD. CODE § 260 (West 1996).
124. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1500. See, e.g., Smith v. Easton, 54 Md. 138 (1880) (proof that
original destroyed permitted use of recipient's copy); AT&T v. United Research Labs., No. 93-
5347, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16125 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (destruction of originals authorized the use
of secondary evidence). The treatment of computer records for purposes of the best evidence
rule is the subject of a specific statute passed in 1983 in California.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1500, a printed representation of com-
puter information or a computer program which is being used by or stored on a
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4. If the document is offered to prove the truth of the statements
asserted therein, are the statements admissible under an exception
to the hearsay rule, such as the business records exception?'
25
5. Has the secondary evidence, offered to prove the contents of the
transmission, been properly authenticated?
1 26
The admissibility of a document offered to prove the existence of
a contract, such as the print-out of the Fred Smith counter-offer
message transmitted over the Internet, is a question of ordinary proof.
In the United States documents are not automatically assumed to be
authentic and are not automatically admitted into evidence. They are
admitted only through the establishment of a foundation for their
receipt.' 27
A foundation is preliminary proof establishing that the document
is what it is claimed to be by its proponent.12 1 With documents of-
fered into evidence for purposes of presenting their content to the
finder of fact, as opposed to exhibits used for illustrative or demon-
strative purposes, foundational testimony must be given by a compe-
tent witness to "authenticate" the document and "identify" the
computer or computer readable storage media shall be admissible to prove the
existence and content of the computer information or computer program.
Computer recorded information or computer programs, or copies of com-
puter recorded information or computer programs, shall not be rendered inadmis-
sible by the best evidence rule. Printed representations of computer information
and computer programs will be presumed to be accurate representations of the
computer information or computer programs that they purport to represent. This
presumption, however, will be a presumption affecting the burden of producing
evidence only. If any party to a judicial proceeding introduces evidence that such
a printed representation is inaccurate or unreliable, the party introducing it into
evidence will have the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that
the printed representation is the best available evidence of the existence and con-
tent of the computer information or computer programs that it purports to
represent.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1500.5.
125. Most computer records will be offered into evidence under the business records excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. FED. RuLEs oF EviD. 803(6); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1271. See, e.g.,
Aguimatang v. California State Lottery, 286 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1991).
126. See CA. EvlD. CODE § 1401 (West 1996). In Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp., the New York Court of Appeal held that it was proper to resort to parol evidence to show
the connection between the document and its author, and the manifestation of the purported
author's intent to be bound by the stated terms. 110 N.E.2d 551 (1953).
127. See Ford v. United States, 10 F.2d 339, 1349-50 (9th Cir. 1926), affd, 273 U.S. 593
(1927) (" here is no presumption that a telegram is sent by the party who purports to sent it.
Before it can be received in evidence, there must be some proof connecting it with its alleged
author."); Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 439 P.2d 889, 897 (1968) ("We understand that in
some legal systems it is assumed that documents are what they purport to be, unless shown to be
otherwise, With us it is the other way around. Generally speaking, documents must be authenti-
cated in some fashion before they are admissible in evidence.").
128. See, e.g., Mayer v Angelica, 790 F.2d 1315, 1340 (7th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1037 (1987).
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purported author. The witness may have firsthand knowledge of the
document - for example, Andy Acquisition's testimony that "Exhibit
A is the e-mail message I received on December 31, 1994 from Fred
Smith making an offer to sell us chips."
In the absence of testimony from a witness with direct knowl-
edge, the proponent of the document might authenticate the document
by offering evidence of the protection of the document against altera-
tion, and of the system used to send, receive, store, and print the docu-
ment so as to establish that it was and can be treated as reliable. A
systems administrator might be called to testify to (1) the fact that the
firm maintained a system of automatically storing e-mail messages
received from internal and external sources, (2) the procedure by
which those documents are stored, (3) the steps taken by the firm to
safeguard the tapes, and (4) the process by which the witness caused
the message to be printed out for purposes of bringing it to court. This
is not much different than traditional testimony given by document
custodians that a particular piece of paper, such as the printout of the
e-mail message, was regularly placed in the company's files, that it
was the company's practice to keep such documents in its files, and
that the exhibit in question was found in the company's files. Alterna-
tively, the person who set up Andy's computer system, including the
nightly back-up of the e-mail traffic,"u9 could testify to the existence
of the backup system, and to the finding of the electronic version of
the message on the back-up tape.130
Garage must do more than offer the e-mail message into evidence
- it must show that the message came from Fred Smith, who mani-
fested an intent to be bound by its contents.' 3 1 In this case, Garage
129. Failure to preserve archived copies of electronic messages may result in criticism of
those who testify from memory of the events unaided, or unhindered, by their then-recorded
communications. See Candle Servs. Ltd. v. Warren Reid Meadowcraft, Q.B. Jan. 27, 1995.
130. In some respects the electronic version of the Fred Smith e-mail message is superior in
evidentiary character to the paper version. The electronic version, as saved on the hard drive
when received and stored on the nightly or weekly backup tape, contains a time and date indicat-
ing the details of the receipt and saving of the message. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of
President, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
131. In Harlow v. Commonwealth, a telegraph office manager testified to the contents of a
telegram received by his office nine months prior to his employment. The telegram was dated at
a location some 400 miles from the scene of the crime, and was offered apparently to show that
the defendant had transferred the stolen money by wire. On appeal from the conviction, defend-
ant argued that:
inhere was no evidence that he sent or authorized the sending of the telegram,
and that the testimony of McClane was pure hearsay and inadmissible in
evidence.
This is a case of first impression in Virginia dealing with the question of the
nature of the evidence necessary to prove the authorship or identity of the sender
of a telegram. The authorities elsewhere are agreed that it is difficult, if not im-
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might offer the declaration of Andy Acquisition as the foundation for
the admission of a print out of Fred Smith's e-mail message. Andy
would testify to the sending of his e-mail message and to the receipt of
Fred's counteroffer in return. Normally, this would be sufficient. 132
In the Garage v. IMS procedings, the system supervisor cannot
"authenticate" the Fred Smith e-mail message, because the supervisor
has no personal knowledge of the actual content of the message or of
the fact that Andy received the Fred Smith e-mail message in response
to Andy's outbound e-mail. The contents of Fred's e-mail, however,
serve to authenticate it as a message from Fred when Andy's outbound
offer message is offered as additional foundation evidence.' 33  The
analogy is again to the law developed with respect to telegrams, where
the law has firmly established reply telegrams as self-authenticating.
In House Grain Co. v. Finerman & Sons,134 the plaintiff and de-
fendant allegedly formed a contract for the sale of barley by means of
an exchange of telegrams. At trial the plaintiff offered into evidence
the telegram he received from the defendant, and it was received. On
appeal, this was argued as error.
The argument is that the telegram was not admissible because there
was no proof George sent it nor proof of his handwriting; that it
was sent by one Borut, who it appears from the evidence was a
business associate of George; and that George testified he did not
send it. House testified that in course of the telephone conversation
he had with George on February 20th, he told George he would
send him a telegram confirming the terms and conditions of the sale
and asked him to send a similar confirming telegram back to
House. When House finished Palmer took the telephone and told
George some of the language to be incorporated in the telegram. In
the course of the conversation House had with Harry on February
possible, to formulate a definite or precise standard governing the admissibility of
a telegram in evidence. It has never been considered safe to make telegrams self-
authenticating. There must be something to show that the message is not the act
of a stranger. While authenticity may be shown by direct and circumstantial evi-
dence, it is not enough that the writing on its face purports to be from the sender.
There must be competent proof that the alleged sender did actually send, or au-
thorize the sending of the telegram in question, whether a copy or original, before
it becomes competent evidence.
The telegram was not signed by anyone. There is no evidence that Harlow
applied for the telegram, furnished the funds for transmission, or from whom the
message came. There is no evidence that it was written, or authorized to be writ-
ten, or sent by Harlow.
131 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1963) (citations omitted).
132. See, e.g., Milner Hotels, Inc. v. Mecklenburg Hotel, Inc., 256 S.E.2d 310 (N.C. App.
1979); McAllister v. George, 140 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1977).
133. See CAL. Ev. CoD § 1421.
134. 253 P.2d 1034 (Cal. App. 1953).
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27th, House showed Harry the telegram. Harry did not question its
authenticity.
The telegram was sent in response to the one sent by House to
George. The fact that the two telegrams may have crossed in trans-
mission does not alter the fact. It is settled that a telegram received
in reply to a telegram addressed to the sender is presumed to be
genuine, and is admissible in evidence without further proof of the
identity of the sender. A reply-telegram authenticates itself.1 35
The fact that the e-mail message from Fred Smith was sent in reply to
Andy Acquisition's proposal, coupled with proof of the subsequent
communications between the parties, admittedly by long distance tele-
phone call and e-mail, conjoined with Garage's taking out of the letter
of credit and its receipt in Singapore by IMS's bank, all serve to au-
thenticate Fred Smith's counteroffer as a genuine e-mail message from
Fred. 136
E-mail messages, like the message from Fred Smith which Ga-
rage seeks to authenticate, consist of two parts: the header and the
body. In the message from Fred Smith to Andy Acquisition dated
December 31, the header is all of the message from the From: line at
the top to the Subject: line about half way down. The information in
the header tells the reader various things about the message:
1. From: shows the address of the userid that sent the message, in
this case fsmith@ix.netcom.com. Netcom is a commercial Internet
supplier, and ix is the identifier given by one of Netcom's mail
servers.
2. Received: shows the path the message took, and the times, dates
and programs used in the communication process. The last Re-
ceived in Fred Smith's message 31 Dec 1994 09:41:08 - 0800, is
the date and time the message was received at also.hooked.net,
Andy's local Internet supplier. The time is local time where the
local time is eight hours behind Greenwich Mean Time.
3. Message-ID: is a unique number tag given to the message at the
time it was first sent.
135. Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Georgia, Fla. & Ala. R.R. v. Blish Mill-
ing Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916); Wilson v. Eddy, 82 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1969); People v. Dinkins, 52
Cal. Rptr. 134 (1966).
136. See, e.g., Halstead v. Minn. Tribune Co., 180 N.W. 556 (Minn. 1920) (copy of tele-
gram of acceptance received by plaintiff in reply to his offer to work for defendant on terms
stated by plaintiff, coupled with proof of destruction of the original message at the sending office
and the parties actual entry into employment relationship, conclusive proof of authentication of
telegram of acceptance); La Mar Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Credit & Commodity Corp., 216
N.Y.S.2d 186 (1961) (telegram of guaranty bearing name of guarantor held to be authentic when
defendant admits causing telegraph company to type its name on the original, since defendant
authorized its name to be affixed upon it).
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4. CC: shows the userids of addressees to whom copies of have
been posted. In this case, copies are shown as having been sent to
Fred Smith (he sent a copy of the message to himself so he can
compare the message as composed with the message as transmitted,
and as a means of notifying himself that his mail is getting
through), and Jim Smith at IMS in Singapore (ims.com.sg).
5. Subject: gives a short description of the text of the message that
follows. The short description has a real world importance larger
than the word subject suggests, because the recipients frequently
will delete mail messages, without reading them, based upon the
userid of the sender and the Subject line. To get Andy's attention,
Fred Smith might have given the Subject line of his e-mail to Andy
Acquisition a better description, such as "Your Order Confirmed
With Changes."
The header information is important for evidentiary purposes, because
it purports to show that Fred Smith was the creator of the message,
shows the time of the creation of the message, and shows the means
by which the message travelled to Andy Acquisition. This showing,
coupled with the "reply letter" doctrine, 137 also serves to authenticate
the e-mail message.138
In the absence of the application of the reply doctrine, the rule
seems to be developing that a proper foundation for the admission of
the record in evidence is present as long as sufficient facts are
presented to the court to warrant a finding that the records are trust-
worthy and the opposing party is afforded an opportunity to inquire
into the accuracy thereof and how the records were maintained and
produced.' 3 9
[The foundation for admission of such evidence consists of show-
ing the input procedures used, the tests for accuracy and reliability
and the fact that an established business relies on the computerized
records in the ordinary course of carrying on its activities. The
[opposing party] then has the opportunity to cross-examine con-
cerning company practices with respect to the input and as to the
137. See, e.g., Scofield v. Parlin & Orendorff Co., 61 F. 804 (7th Cir. 1894); Lewis v.
Couch, 65 P.2d 988 (Okla. 1937).
138. See FED. R. EvrD. § 901(b)(4) ("Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or
other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances" satisfy the authentica-
tion requirement.). See, e.g., House Grain Co. v. Finerman & Sons, 253 P.2d 1034 (1953) (tele-
gram received in response to telegram addressed to sender authenticates itself).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 863 (1990). See generally, Chris Reed, Authenticating Electronic Mail Messages - Some
Evidential Problems, 4 Sor'wAie LJ. 161 (1991); Rudolph J. Peritz, Computer Data and Relia-
bility: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80
Nw. U. L. REv. 956 (1986); Andrew Johnston-Laird, Smoking Guns and Spinning Disks, CoM-
putER LAw., Aug. 1994, at 1.
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accuracy of the computer as a memory bank and retriever of infor-
mation .... T]he court [must) "be satisfied with all reasonable
certainty that both the machine and those who supply its informa-
tion have performed their functions with utmost accuracy." ...
[The trustworthiness of the particular records should be ascer-
tained before they are admitted and... the burden of presenting an
adequate foundation for receiving the evidence should be on the
parties seeking to introduce it rather than upon the party opposing
its introduction.140
As one court said, "[b]usiness records are reliable to the extent they
are compiled consistently and conscientiously."' 14 1
In the reported decisions discussed above, such as Bibb v. Al-
len,' 42 the courts have permitted extrinsic proof to be offered that a
nickname, cipher, or assumed name has been adopted or used by a
particular person or firm, and that a document "signed" with the as-
sumed name is binding upon the person or firm adopting the name. In
the Garage-IMS transaction under discussion, both Fred Smith
(fsmith) and Andy Acquisition (andya) have adopted Internet "han-
dles," and the court should conclude that the e-mail message bearing
the name "fsmith" is "signed" for purposes of the Statute of Frauds.
The fact that the "signature" is mechanically reproduced, rather than
placed upon paper, is no longer a valid objection.143 As discussed
above, in dealing with the requirement for a signature it is the intent
rather than the form of the act that is important. While one's signature
is usually made by writing one's name in long-hand, the same purpose
can be accomplished by placing any writing, indicia or symbol which
the signer chooses to adopt and use as his signature and by which it
may be proved, e.g., by finger- or thumbprints, by a cross or other
mark, or by any type of mechanically reproduced or stamped facsimile
of his signature, as effectively as by his own handwriting.' 44
In certain situations there might be a further evidentiary objec-
tion, hearsay. In the Garage v. IMS proceedings, Garage offers the
140. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228, 1241 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974) (quoting United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1969)). See also
United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219
(9th Cir. 1985).
141. United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 192 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1186 (1986). See also, United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 908 (1991).
142. 149 U.S. 481 (1893). In the Bibb case, telegrams ordering commodities to be
purchased on the New York Cotton Exchange were sent in cipher using aliases; the sender was
held bound on the contracts, against a statute of frauds objection.
143. See, e.g., State v. Watts, 222 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. 1976).
144. Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 425 P.2d 773 (Utah 1967).
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Fred Smith e-mail message to prove the receipt and its contents, Le.,
the terms stated in the e-mail which Garage accepted through Andy
Acquisition's e-mail. Given Fred Smith's apparent position with IMS,
the court would probably consider the e-mail message a party admis-
sion and find the contents admissible.
In the first reported case dealing with the admissibility of an e-
mail message, Monotype Corp. PLC v. International Typeface
Corp.,145 an e-mail message from Adler, a Microsoft employee, to an-
other Microsoft employee was sought to be admitted as a business
record. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of admis-
sion of the e-mail message on the grounds that the trial court properly
found that its prejudicial content outweighed its probative value. The
Court of Appeals went on to say, however, the e-mail message was
not a systematic business activity, but rather "an ongoing electronic
message and retrieval system."' 146
The Monotype court seems to have missed the point, which was
whether an e-mail message, prepared by one employee and sent to
another employee in the ordinary course of business, and either cap-
tured on paper, or archived electronically, is a document falling within
the business records exception to the hearsay rule. Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, all that is required to be shown is that the record
was "kept in the usual course of a regularly conducted business activ-
ity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum."147 It would seem sufficient, under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule, that a witness be offered to iden-
tify the details of the electronic mail system, to the finding of the
particular message in question in the archives or among the printouts
of messages, that it was the regular practices of the employees of the
company in question to use e-mail and send messages, and that the
company in question, or companies in general, rely upon e-mail in the
course of business communications.1 48 Thus, for example, a series of
incoming file messages, seized from trash cans, were held to be ad-
145. 43 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1994).
146. Il at 450.
147. FED. R. EviD. § 803(6).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989) (hotel director of commu-
nications properly authenticated hotel telephone billing records, generated by a computer system,
showing calls made to particular telephone number from the defendant's hotel room at a particu-
lar time); United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1984) (witness need not be personally
familiar with the entries, only the procedures under which the records were kept); United States
v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972) (upholding admissibil-
ity of notes made by a company official while participating in an extortion ring); United States v.
Moran, 151 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1945) (memorandum of a telephone conversation made by a bank
employee).
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missible as business records in a prosecution for illegal export activi-
ties in United States v. Gregg.14 9
The questions posed by the law of evidence in the context of e-
mail, as stated by Baum and Perritt, can thus be summarized as
follows:
1. Proving that an electronic communication actually came from
the party that it purports to come from
2. Proving the content of the transaction, namely, the communica-
tions that actually occurred between the parties during the contract
formation process
3. Reducing the possibility of deliberate alteration of the contents
of the electronic record of the transactions
4. Reducing the possibility of inadvertent alteration of the contents
of the electronic record of the transaction.' 50
XII. THE FuTuRE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The continuing existence of a statute of frauds with respect to
contracts is currently the matter of wide ranging debate in the United
States. There is some feeling that the statute of frauds should be abol-
ished, not only for sales transactions, but for licensing transactions as
well. Others have argued that licensing transactions should be subject
to the same requirements of a writing signed by the party to be
charged that is required of contracts for the sale of goods.' 51 At pres-
ent, the drafting committee organized under the auspices of the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has both
options under study.
Many contract scholars believe that contracts ought to be allowed
to be formed and proven by any means, and that requiring writings is
inconsistent with modem high speed communications mechanisms re-
sulting in nonpaper-based transactions. The arguments advanced in
favor of the abolition of the statute of frauds tend to focus on the many
exceptions to the application of the statute, and to the supposed reali-
149. 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
150. MIcHAEL S. BAUM & HENRY H. PERURTT, JR., ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING
AND EDI LAw 344 § 6.23 (1991).
151. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and Rein-
vigorating Article 2,35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1337 (1994); Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License
Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RTrrGERS COM-
PUTsR & TECH. LJ. 281 (1993); David A. Rice, Lessons About the Realities of Contract for
U.C.C. Article 2 Revision and A Future Software Contract Statute, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. LJ. 499 (1992); Robert A. Feldman, A New Draft of UCC Article 2: A High Tech Code
Takes Form, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1995, at 1.
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ties of "modem commerce" that transactions are created by exchanges
of electronic or other communications that supposedly are not
"signed" "writings." The recent UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts, 152 intended to harmonize international
contract law, does not require a contract to be concluded in or evi-
denced by writing. It may be proved by any means, including
witnesses.15 3
Although many transactions do take place without "signed writ-
ings" in the traditional sense of letters and subscribed contracts, partic-
ularly given the increasing importance of electronic contracts, this
paper suggests that there are in reality few analytical problems with
traditional law. In any event the perceived limitations on the tradi-
tional notions of "writing" and "signed" can be easily corrected by
modernized definitions of "signed" and "writing," or by the adoption
of an electronic concept of adequate contract documentation.
The goal to be achieved is the facilitation of proof of the forma-
tion of contracts, and the assurance that the offeree truly manifested an
intent to be bound. In Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson,' the Ninth Cir-
cuit, reviewing a statute of frauds question, mused about the role of
enforcement attitudes on achieving this goal.
[O]ne well may wonder if the courts from the beginning had vigor-
ously enforced the statute of frauds from its first adoption in Eng-
land, wouldn't we have less injustice? If people were brought up in
the tradition that certain contracts inescapably had to be in writing,
wouldn't those affected thereby get their contracts into writing and,
on the whole, wouldn't the public be better off?.
But we have to take the law as we find it. For generations, in
hard cases, the courts have been making exceptions to "do justice,"
granting relief here, calling a halt there. The result is that one with
difficulty can predict the result in a given state and the situation
becomes more confounded when the query arises as to whose (what
state's) law we should apply. 155
152. PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL CONTRACTS, (International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law, 1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES].
153. kIL art 1.2. The Commentary to Article 1.2 notes that this Principle can be overridden
by applicable local law, which may impose special requirements - such as writings - with
respect to certain types of contracts and certain contract clauses. Id. art 1.2, cmt.2. The parties
to the agreement or negotiation are of course free to insist that no agreement is effective until a
writing is created and signed. Id. art. 2.13.
154. 217 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1954).
155. Id. at 297.
2991996]

